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Scholars’ Briefs and the Vocation of a Law Professor 
By Richard H. Fallon, Jr.
1 
 
At least within the loosely defined domain of public law, any law professor who 
does not get asked to sign Ascholars= briefs@ is not much of a scholar.  Scholars= briefs, in 
which collections of professors appear as amici curiae to support a party in litigation 
before a court, appear to grow more common each year.  During the 2010 Term, in which 
the Supreme Court decided 85 cases, it received 56 briefs on behalf of groups of self-
identified legal scholars or law professors, with at least one such brief being filed in 30 
cases, or more than a third of the total.
2  In at least seven cases, dueling teams of scholars 
filed briefs supporting opposing sides.
3  By contrast, during the Court’s 1985 Term, the 
Justices decided 159 cases
4 yet received only three scholars’ briefs.
5 
                                                 
1 Ralph S. Tyler, Jr. Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School.  I am grateful to Betsy 
Bartholet, John Coates, Jesse Choper, Glen Cohen, Ronald Dworkin, Charles Fried, Barry Friedman, John 
Goldberg, Philip Hamburger, Debbie Hellman, Ben Heineman, Steve Horowitz, Vicki Jackson, Richard 
Lazarus, Daryl Levinson, Dan Meltzer, Thomas Nagel, Athnea Roberts, Ben Roin, David Shapiro, Stephen 
Shay, David Strauss, Detlev Vagts, David Wilkins, and participants in a Harvard Law School Faculty 
Workshop and the NYU Colloquium for Legal, Political and Social Philosophy for extremely insightful 
comments on earlier drafts, to Alan Dershowitz and Andy Kaufman, for helpful conversation, and to 
Alexander Dryer, Patrick Gibson, and Stephanie Young for research assistance. 
2 The Court decided 85 cases overall, but seven of the decisions were per curiam in cases without briefing 
on the merits.  To identify the number of scholars’ briefs filed, my research assistants did a Lexis search of 
amicus briefs submitted in the 2010 Term that contained the words “scholar” or “professor” in their titles.  
They then, separately, looked at all other amicus briefs for argued cases to determine whether the amici 
identified themselves as professors.  Out of the 63 briefs that they identified this way, I excluded six on the 
ground that the amici were either professors emeriti, professors in fields other than law, law professors 
from outside of the United States, or were associated with U.S. law schools in some capacity but lacked 
professorial appointments. 
3 In three cases, there were multiple professors’ briefs on at least one side.  See Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. 
v. Connecticut, 131 S.Ct. 2527 (2011), in which there were three briefs each for petitioner (Brief of Law 
Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,  Am. Elec. Power Inc., 131 S.Ct. 2527 (No. 10-174), 
2011 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 189; Brief of Amicus Curiae Nicholas Johnson in Support of Petitioners,  
Am. Elec. Power Inc., 131 S.Ct. 2527 (No. 10-174), 2011 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 184; Brief of Law 
Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Am. Elec. Power Inc., 131 S.Ct. 2527 (No. 10-174), 
2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2268 (urging that the Court grant certiorari)) and for respondent (Brief 
Amici Curiae of Tort Law Scholars in Support of Respondents, Am. Elec. Power Inc., 131 S.Ct. 2527 (No. 
10-174), 2011 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 368 Brief of Environmental Law Professors as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondents, Am. Elec. Power Inc., 131 S.Ct. 2527 (No. 10-174), 2011 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS   372; Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Am. Elec. Power Inc., 
131 S.Ct. 2527 (No. 10-174), 2011 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 360); AT&T v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 
(2011), in which there were four briefs in support of respondent (Brief of Civil Procedure and Complex 
Litigation Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, AT&T, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893),  
2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1940; Brief of Federal Jurisdiction Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, AT&T, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893),  2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1932; Brief of Contracts 
Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, AT&T, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893),  2010 U.S. S. 
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1934; Brief of Arbitration Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, AT&T, 
131 S.Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893),  2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1936) and one in support of petitioner (Brief 
Amici Curiae of Distinguished Law Professors in Support of Petitioner, &T, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893),  
2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1042); and Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 
(2011), in which there were two briefs for petitioner (Brief Amici Curiae of 41 Law, Economics, and 
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Litigants and their lawyers obviously believe that “scholars= briefs”—a term I use 
to refer both to those that are explicitly so designated and to other law professors’ briefs 
whose signatories represent that their only interest lies in the proper development of the 
law—provide important support for their causes.
6   Surveys of judges, Justices, and law 
clerks point to the same conclusion.  In a questionnaire sent to judges and Justices about 
amicus curiae briefs in general, one researcher included a query specifically about law 
professors’ briefs, the responses to which she summarized as follows: 
 
As experts in particular fields of law, professors are able to offer an 
informed legal analysis of a pressing legal question from a relatively 
                                                                                                                                                 
Business Professors in Support of Petitioner, Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (No. 10-06)  
2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2329; Brief Amici Curiae of 26 Law, Economics, and Business Professors 
in Support of Petitioner,  Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (No. 10-06)  2010 U.S. S. Ct. 
Briefs LEXIS 2054) and one for respondent (Brief of Law Professors, as Amicus Curiae, in Support of 
Respondent, Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (No. 10-06), 2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 5).  
In four additional cases, there was one professors’ brief on each side.  See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. 
Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011) (Brief for Law Professors Robert Bartlett, et al, as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners, Erica P. John Fund, Inc. 131 S. Ct. 2179 (No. 09-1403), 2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 306; and, Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Erica P. John Fund, 
Inc. 131 S. Ct. 2179 (No. 09-1403), 2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 424); Mayo Found. v. U.S., 131 S. Ct. 
704 (2011) (Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Kristin E. Hickman in Support of Respondent, Mayo 131 S. 
Ct. 704 (No. 09-837), 2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1925; and, Brief of Tax Professor Carlton M. Smith 
as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners, Mayo 131 S. Ct. 704 (No. 09-837), 2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 1260); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S.Ct. 2653 (2011) (Brief for Dr. Khaled el Emam and Jane 
Yakowitz, Esq. as Amici Curiae for Respondents, Sorrell 131 S.Ct. 2653 (No. 10-779),  2011 U.S. S. Ct. 
Briefs LEXIS 433; and, Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and Legal 
Scholars and Technical Experts in Support of the Petitioners, 131 S.Ct. 2653 (No. 10-779),  2011 U.S. S. 
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 267); and Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2592 (2011) (Brief of Amici Curiae Law 
Professors S. Todd Brown, G. Marcus Cole, Ronald D. Rotunda, and Todd J. Zywicki in Support of 
Respondent, Stern 131 S. Ct. 2592 (No. 10-189)  2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2346; and, Brief in 
Support of Petitioner for Amici Curiae Professors Richard Aaron, et al, Stern 131 S. Ct. 2592 (No. 10-189)  
2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS  2094). 
4 See The Supreme Court, 1985 Term: Leading Cases, The Statistics, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 304 (1986). 
5 One of the briefs came in Thornburg v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 
747 (1986), one was submitted in Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986), and the other in Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).  Although the brief in Bowers was filed by Professor David Robinson of 
the George Washington University Law School, it focused much more on public health issues than on legal 
issues and fits only maginally within the category of legal scholars’ briefs with which I am concerned.   
The briefs cited in this footnote were again located by a research assistant, who employed the same 
research methodology described in note __, supra. 
  The increase in the number of scholars’ briefs may be part of a general phenomenon of increasing 
numbers of amicus curiae—or “friend of the court”—briefs filed by non-parties more generally.  See 
Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: Transforming the Court by 
Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1514 (2008) (“There was an average of just under three amicus 
briefs filed for every case heard on the merits from 1976 through 1985, compared to an average of about 
nine amicus briefs filed for every case head on the merits in October term 2005—a more than 300% relatie 
increase.”); Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empirical Study of Amici Curiae in Federal Court: A Fine 
Balance of Access, Efficiency, and Adversarialism, 27 REV. LITIG. 669, 671-72 (2008) (noting that during 
the second half of the twentieth century “the Supreme Court saw an 800% increase in the number of amicus 
filings).   
6 See infra notes __-__ (discussing the grounds for this belief). 
 
  2neutral perspective.  Thus, it is not surprising that  all of the [three] 
Supreme Court [Justices who responded] indicated that law professors are 
moderately helpful to the [adjudicatory] process, as did 56.6% of Circuit 
Court respondents and 52.8% of District Court respondents.
7 
 
Another survey of Supreme Court law clerks found that “[t]he overwhelming 
majority of clerks (88%) indicated that they would be inclined to give an amicus 
brief filed by an academic closer attention [than most other amicus briefs]—at 
least initially.”
8 
 
With scholars’ briefs having the potential to influence the outcome of sometimes 
high-stakes litigation, requests to prepare them often come either from a party or from a 
firm or organization whose interests align with those of a party.
9  Many law professors 
seem to like to draft, or at least collaborate with law firms in drafting, scholars’ briefs.
10 
 
For the professors who are asked merely to sign a scholars’ brief, participation 
may be even harder to resist.  Dangled before them, with little or no work required, is the 
possibility of having an impact on the development of the law.  As long as the brief 
supports the right side, it is hard for a professor who wants to influence the law=s 
trajectoryBas nearly all of us doBto say no. 
 
But law professors often should say no, or at least we should say no much more 
frequently than many of us now do.  And when we say yesBas we should sometimesBwe 
should insist that scholars= briefs reflect higher norms of scholarly integrity than many 
such briefs now satisfy.  Or so I shall argue in this essay. 
 
In so arguing, I hope to spur an overdue discussion.  The subject of 
scholars= briefs, and the standards that law professors ought to apply in 
determining whether to sign them, has received almost no attention in the 
literature.
11  Yet the topic is an important one.  Besides forming an increasingly 
                                                 
7 Simard, supra note __, at 698-99. 
8 Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae Briefs, 20 J.L. & 
POL. 33, 52 (2004).  A possible explanation is that clerks who are overwhelmed with more briefs than they 
can read carefully at least begin by paying special attention to those briefs carrying names that they 
recognize and associate with expertise.  Cf. Lazarus, supra note __, at 1526, 1542 (maintaining that 
experienced Supreme Court advocates have enhanced credibility with law clerks). 
9 Although not speaking specifically of scholars’ briefs, Simard, supra note __, at 708-09, notes that 
“litigants are quite strategic about the process of soliciting and managing amici participation.”  Supreme 
Court Rule 37.6 now provides that amicus briefs must indicate whether counsel for a party authored the 
brief in whole or in part and must identify any person other than the amicus, its members, or its counsel 
who made a financial contribution to the brief’s preparation. 
10 A friend tells a revealing anecdote about being solicited by a lawyer from a law firm to take the lead in 
organizing a scholars’ brief.  Why, the friend asked, would the lawyer, who was being paid by a client, 
expect a law professor to work on an amicus brief for free?  The reported response: “There are lots of law 
profs eager to file a brief in the Supreme Court so we don’t need to pay.”  Email from Barry Friedman, 
Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, to Richard Fallon, Professor of Law, Harvard Law 
School (July 13, 2011) (on file with author). 
11 During the controversy surrounding the impeachment of President Bill Clinton, hundreds of law 
professors signed a joint letter opining that the conduct in which Clinton was alleged to have engaged did 
 
  3significant component of many law professors= professional lives, scholars’ briefs 
open a window onto broader questions about law professors= professional roles.  
We are long past the day, if there ever was one, when most law professors thought 
their sole professional contributions should come through traditional scholarship 
and teaching.  Modern law professors familiarly participate in law reform 
initiatives, take on paid and unpaid client representation, and write regularly for 
non-scholarly audiences.  Indeed, many law schools now boast in their alumni 
magazines and on their websites whenever their faculty publish op-ed articles, 
appear on radio or television programs, or even post comments on blogs. 
 
In my view, participation in scholars’ briefs gives rise to more complex 
ethical issues than do most of the other sub-roles that law professors play, largely 
because the signers of scholars’ briefs represent their submissions as offering 
distinctively scholarly expertise and perspective.  But there is of course no 
complete divorce between the role of teacher and scholar, on the one hand, and 
most of the other law-related functions that law professors sometimes take on.  To 
be blunt, law professors recurrently attempt to leverage their credibility as 
teachers and scholars to influence non-scholarly audiences, sometimes for 
personal gain and sometimes without satisfying the standards on which their 
scholarly reputations depend.  When law professors seek to trade on their 
academic reputations in the performance of non-academic roles, two sets of moral 
and ethical issues arise.  One involves the extent, if any, to which an implied 
warranty of scholarly integrity ought to preclude professors from making 
assertions to courts or to non-scholarly audiences that they would not make in 
scholarly books or articles.  The other set of worries involves the risk that non-
scholarly activities—which would otherwise be permissible or even admirable in 
themselves—might inhibit future scholarly assertion of inconvenient truths. 
 
Although my central focus is on scholars’ briefs, it is impossible to think 
deeply about the standards that law professors ought to apply to requests to sign 
them without also reflecting on the standards that law professors ought to apply in 
other roles.  As a result, my discussion in this Essay will range rather broadly at 
some points.  Part I provides an admittedly impressionistic survey of current 
practice regarding scholars’ briefs.  Part II then begins an examination of the 
moral and ethical issues that requests to participate in such briefs raise by 
contrasting the role of amici professors with that of other parties to litigation.  It 
also contrasts the norms of scholarly integrity that apply to professors publishing 
                                                                                                                                                 
not constitute “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” in the constitutional sense.  See Neal Devins, Bearing 
False Witness: The Clinton Impeachment and the Future of Academic Freedom, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 165 
(1999).  Shortly thereafter, a pair of articles debated the propriety of law professors with widely varied 
levels of specifically pertinent expertise signing group letters expressing legal judgments.  See Devins, 
supra note __; Cass R. Sunstein, Professors and Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 191 (1999).  In a follow-on 
published more than a decade ago, Ward Farnsworth thoughtfully expanded the discussion to include 
scholars’ briefs.  See Ward Farnsworth, Talking Out of School: Notes on the Transmission of Intellectual 
Capital From the Legal Academy to Public Tribunals, 81 B.U. L. REV. 13 (2001).  Since then, however, the 
topic of professorial integrity in regard to scholars’ briefs has lain almost entirely dormant. 
 
  4books and articles with those applicable to lawyers filing briefs on behalf of 
clients. 
 
With the argument in Part II having assumed that morality is partly role-
based, Part III develops a framework for considering how moral and ethical 
obligations—which it distinguishes—can vary from one role (such as that of 
lawyer for a client) to another (such as that of author of scholarly publications).  
To give context to judgments about the norms appropriate to participation in 
scholars’ briefs, Part III also briefly surveys the moral and ethical obligations that 
attach to some of the other sub-roles that law professors sometimes inhabit. 
 
Part IV proposes standards of scholarly integrity that law professors 
should apply in determining whether to sign scholars’ briefs.  It maintains that 
norms of scholarly integrity should bar law professors from signing scholars’ 
briefs unless they have personal knowledge of all of the principal authorities on 
which a brief relies.  More substantively, it argues that professors should not sign 
a brief unless, in their roles as scholars and teachers, they would applaud a court 
that simply adopted the brief’s reasoning as its own or they make clear that they 
have assumed arguendo the validity of premises that they would otherwise 
contest.  Part IV also draws similar conclusions about other collective expressions 
of purportedly expert legal opinions. 
 
Part V considers and rejects possible objections to the stringent 
requirements that Part IV proposes.  Part VI is a brief conclusion. 
 
  I.  Emerging Practice and Some Tentative Grounds for Uneasiness 
 
No writing of which I am aware provides more than a cursory description of 
current practices surrounding scholars’ briefs.  To ground the mostly normative 
discussion that will follow, let me begin by describing the kind of situationBwhich I 
believe to be quite commonBthat provokes my concern. 
 
I am a law professor with expertise (or so I would say) in the fields of 
Constitutional Law and Federal Courts.  I also have political or ideological views.  
Beyond doubt, those views sometimes color my judgment about how the law ought to 
develop.  When I know only scanty details about the issues that a case presents, my 
political values are likely to have a particularly strong effect on my initial, tentative 
judgment about how the case should come out.  With reasonable frequency, however, 
closer study will alter my views, which I hope display what Professor Dworkin calls 
“integrity.”
12  For meBas I believe for most law professorsBwhat counts as the best or 
correct resolution of a legal issue depends partly on how the result would cohere or fail to 
cohere with a sometimes intricate network of existing authorities.  Giving proper account 
to such considerations of Afit@ often takes careful study and deliberation,
13 even for 
someone with general expertise in a field.  I thus assume that—for others as well as 
                                                 
12 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 164-67, 225-75 (1986).   
13 See id. at 239, 255-58 (discussing “fit” as an integral element of legal interpretation). 
 
  5myself—a sincere, informed judgment about how a legal issue ought to be resolved is not 
a mere expression of political preference.  
 
Nevertheless, at least within the fields of Constitutional Law and Federal Courts, 
solicitation of participation in scholars’ briefs almost invariably occurs with ideological 
views in mind.  A friend, acquaintance, or occasionally a stranger will ask me to consider 
either taking the lead in developing a scholars’ brief or joining a brief that champions a 
position with which the solicitor expects me to sympathize.  Ideally, however, those 
seeking participants would like the list to signal that scholars of all political stripes have 
arrived at a particular conclusion based on their disinterested legal expertise.
14  When I 
am solicited, typically based on the assumption that my generally liberal leanings make 
me a good candidate to support the conclusion that a brief urges, the solicitor frequently 
inquires whether I know of any conservative professors who also might agree.  
Colleagues tell similar stories.  Nothing is more welcome than participation of perceived 
conservatives in briefs taking liberal positions and of perceived liberals in conservative 
briefs. 
 
Nearly as often as not, the scholars= briefs that I am asked to sign have been 
researched and written not by a scholar, but by lawyers in a law firm.  When lawyers 
write the briefs, one or more professors may play guiding roles, almost always on the 
basis of deep general knowledge, and sometimes abetted by further, case-specific 
research.  After a brief is completed, the authors will do their best to accommodate 
suggestions by any solicited signatory as long as the suggestions accord with their draft’s 
general approach.  Typically, however, solicitation comes close to the deadline for a 
brief’s submission.  Only rarely does an effort to get a large number of scholars to 
contribute their expertise, or pool their individual insights, occur at the front-end of the 
process. 
 
In every case in which I have been solicited to sign a scholars= brief, the brief was 
by all appearances very competent.  If I may flatter my fellow professors, the briefs that 
they write tend to be better, on average, than those that practicing lawyers draft for law 
professors to sign.   Among other things, amicus briefs written by law professors are 
more likely to contain distinctive insights not already included in the parties’ briefs—
though they by no means always do so, as I shall explain more fully below.  But in saying 
that the scholars’ briefs that I have been asked to join generally seem to me to be very 
competent, I must emphasize two qualifications. 
 
First, although the briefs that are sent to me invariably address issues within my 
general expertise, my knowledge rarely extends to everything that the briefs assert.  An 
example may clarify the distinction.  As the Supreme Court began its 2010 Term, a friend 
asked me to consider signing an amicus brief on behalf of “law professors who teach and 
                                                 
14 In an empirical study of Supreme Court law clerks, “[m]any clerks said”—albeit not with specific regard 
to legal scholars—“that they would read a brief filed by unexpected allies simply because they would be 
[unusually] interested to see what it said.”  Lynch, supra note __, at 64.   
 
  6write in the area of constitutional law, federal courts, and federal jurisdiction.”
15  The 
brief addressed a highly complex question of federal jurisdiction over a habeas corpus 
petition filed by a prison inmate who had been convicted by a California state court and 
who, the California Supreme Court ruled, had failed to bring a timely appeal within the 
state judicial system.  The brief asserted that the prison warden who was the “respondent” 
in the action had asked the Justices to raise even further the already imposing barrier to 
federal judicial review in cases in which state courts refuse to address constitutional 
claims.
16  The sole ground for my hesitation in pronouncing the brief—which was written 
by Professor Michael Dorf—to be simply exemplary in all respects is that it relied on so 
many cases.  Of the dozens of Supreme Court decisions to which the brief referred, there 
were some that I know well, but others that I recall only hazily at best.  The brief also 
cited at least nine Supreme Court cases that I cannot remember ever having read at all, 
and twelve lower court decisions that I know I have never read.  With respect to the 
brief’s treatment of these authorities, how could I say more than that my highly favorable 
appraisal rested on “appearances”? 
 
The second qualification involves my attachment of the word Acompetent@ to the 
word Abrief.@  When making claims that I know enough to assess, the scholars= briefs that 
I am asked to sign often advance assertions that lie within the fair bounds of legal 
argument, but that nonetheless seem to me to be oversimplified.  Assertions that “Case X 
stands for Proposition Y” often occupy this category.  But I can perhaps more clearly 
illustrate the point with another example. 
 
Within the year, a justly renowned law professor asked me to join a scholars’ 
brief (to be filed in a lower federal court) supporting the constitutionality of the provision 
of the recently enacted national health care law that requires some individuals either to 
purchase health insurance or pay a penalty.
17  Apparently in order to address challengers’ 
claims that the mandate exceeds Congress’s originally understood powers under the 
Commerce Clause, the brief emphasized a historical argument in favor of 
constitutionality.
18 
                                                 
15 The brief was filed in Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120 (2011).  See Amici Curiae Brief of Federal 
Courts Scholars in Support of Respondent, Walker 131 S. Ct. 1120 (No. 09-996), 2010 U.S. Sup. Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 1992. 
16 See id. at **8-9. 
17 The brief has now been revised, and slightly different versions have been filed in different courts.  The 
most recent version is Brief of Law Professors Barry Friedman, Matthew Adler, et al., in Support of 
Defendants-Appellees, Seven-Sky v. Holder, 2011 WL 1113489 (No. 11-5047) (D.C. Cir. 2011).  
18 The place of the original understanding in constitutional adjudication is complex and contested.  
Positions range from the view that originalism is necessary and inescapable for there to be genuine 
constitutional “interpretation,” see, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: 
TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 60-61, 88-89 (1999), to the view that any 
robust form of originalism is unworkable or nonsensical, see, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is 
Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009).  Nevertheless, nearly everybody believes the original history and 
understanding of constitutional provisions to be at least relevant to constitutional adjudication, insofar as it 
can be ascertained.  The sharpest disagreements involve the proper answers to at least two, closely related 
questions.  See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Are Originalist Constitutional Theories Principled, or Are They 
Rationalizations for Conservatism?, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 8-11 (2011).  The first involves the 
ultimate authority that the original understanding properly exerts.  Strict originalists maintain that the 
Supreme Court should always decide cases in accord with the original understanding.   See, e.g., Randy E. 
 
  7 
Unequivocal historical arguments about the original understanding of 
constitutional language often make me nervous.  To begin with, the question whether 
congressional power to require the purchase of health insurance falls within the original 
understanding of the commerce power may well have no answer as a matter of historical 
fact.  The founding generation never confronted that or any similar question.  Any direct 
response may require speculation about what imagined, hypothetical members of the 
founding generation would have said or thought if provided with more or less information 
about why a remote future generation might wish to enact a national insurance mandate.
19 
 
Beyond that problem, constitutional law professors might offer a number of 
potentially pertinent observations about the founding generation’s thought and 
expectations concerning congressional power under Article I.  Among them would be 
these: (1) A resolution of the Constitutional Convention that the Committee of Detail 
sought to implement when it drafted the various provisions of Article I, including the 
Commerce Clause, provided that Congress should have power Ato legislate in all cases for 
the general interests of the Union, and also in those to which the States are separately 
incompetent.@
20  (2) The Constitution=s authors and ratifiers intended to create a national 
government of limited powers only, with many of the most important regulatory 
responsibilities reserved to the states.
21  (3) The members of the founding generation 
could not have imagined Congress mandating the purchase of health insurance.
22 
   
The brief that I was asked to sign emphasized the first of these three strands of 
relevant evidence and essentially ignored the other two.  In my view, its argumentation 
fell well within the bounds of what lawyers could permissibly say in a brief.  The brief 
was informative.  In addition, I find its larger argument that the national health care 
mandate should be judged constitutional when seen in the broad sweep of American legal 
                                                                                                                                                 
Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 
257, 269 (2005).   Others believe that the original understanding, insofar as it can be ascertained, is relevant 
but not necessarily decisive.  The second debated question involves exactly what historians should look for 
or at in identifying the original understanding or original public meaning.  Most self-styled originalists 
appear to believe that inquiry should aim at identifying how linguistically competent and otherwise well-
informed members of a prior generation would have understood constitutional language’s specific bearing 
on modern issues.  See, e.g., Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the 
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1132-33 (2003); John O. McGinniss & Michael 
Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as the Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 374 
(2007).  By contrast, most non-originalists, including me, tend to believe that both history and 
constitutional adjudication are more complex, messy, and sometimes conflicted than originalists typically 
acknowledge and that a multitude of historical facts are potentially pertinent. 
19 See, e.g., McGinniss & Rappaport, supra note __, at 374 (asserting that “the focus of originalism should 
be on how a reasonable person at the time of the Constitution’s adoption would have [understood] its words 
and thought they should be interpreted”). 
20 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 21 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). 
21 The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution succinctly summarizes this understanding: “The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States, respectively, or to the people.” 
22 See generally  JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS (1996) (emphasizing the failure of the founding 
generation to foresee or resolve many of the constitutional questions arising in later generations). 
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functional necessity—wholly persuasive.  Nevertheless, I declined to join the brief, even 
though a number of the constitutional law professors whom I most respect made a 
different choice.  The brief’s presentation of the historical evidence bearing on the 
original understanding was not nuanced or balanced.   A purportedly scholarly book or 
article that asserted its claims without further qualification would attract derision as one-
sided if not misleading. 
 
This observation leads to a further comment that may surprise the uninitiated: 
Many scholars’ briefs are actually not very scholarly.  When drafted by law professors 
nearly as often as when written by practicing lawyers, scholars’ briefs tend to be rather 
ordinary briefs that most commonly make the same arguments as the brief for the party 
that they support.
23  As previous comments will have signaled, this is a generalization, 
not a categorical truth.  Scholars’ briefs occasionally rise to the level of magnificence.
24  
Nevertheless, briefs written to win the agreement of large numbers of lawyers (as law 
professors are) tend to get flattened out to the lowest common denominator.  Among law 
professors, the lowest common denominator is likely to be relatively standard, lawyerly 
argument. 
 
Like the recognition that a brief overreaches my actual expertise, the 
thought that my joining a brief would associate my name with claims that I would 
not make in a book or law review article strikes me as a reason meriting pause.  If 
I am to identify myself as a scholar by signing a Ascholars= brief,@ or as a professor 
who is an expert in the field and interested only in the proper development of the 
law, ought the brief not satisfy the norms of scholarly integrity to which we hold 
books and law review articles?  
  
Maybe, but to say that a thought should give pause is not to say that it 
necessarily ought to prove decisive.  As noted above, there are snippets of 
evidence suggesting that judges, Justices, and their clerks may look at scholars’ 
                                                 
23 An often expressed worry about amicus briefs in general, if not of scholars’ briefs in particular, is that 
they may be orchestrated by the parties to a case as a means of overcoming page limits on parties’ briefs.  
See, e.g., Glassroth v. Moore, 347 U.S. 916, 919 (11
th Cir. 2003).  A much-much cited article, Samuel 
Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 694, 695 (1963), argues 
that the typical function of amicus curiae briefs evolved “from neutral friendship to partisan advocacy” 
during the nineteenth century.  A more recent study that relies heavily on a computerized search of cases 
included in searchable databases, Stuart Banner, The Myth of the Neutral Amicus: American Courts and 
Their Friends, 1790-1890, 20 CONST. COMMENTARY 111 (2003), revises the long-accepted picture.  
According to Banner, “[t]here was never a time in American practice when an amicus was only allowed to 
offer neutral advice.” Id. at 113.  Although “[t]here were more neutral than partisan amici in 1790-1820,” 
id. at 119, “[a]fter 1831-40 the percentage of amici who were neutral never rose above 18% in any decade.”  
Id. 
24 I think, for example, of the brief filed by my colleague Laurence Tribe, among others, in the gay-rights 
case of Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), and the “Philosophers’ Brief” filed by the lawyer-
philosopher Ronald Dworkin, among others, in two cases involving claimed rights to physician-assisted 
suicide, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), and Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).  
 
  9briefs with greater interest than other amicus briefs.
25  The literature on amicus 
curiae briefs—the larger category of which scholars’ briefs are a subspecies—
finds that amicus briefs have the capacity to help the causes that they promote.
26  
When other law professors solicit my participation in amicus briefs, they 
frequently begin by saying that they would not ask me to join if the case were not 
unusually important.  Consequences matter to me.  Mulling whether to participate 
in a scholars= brief that advocates a result that I am disposed to favor, I thus feel 
both temptation and sometimes even moral pressure to join, even though doing so 
would also leave me uneasy, for reasons involving instincts about obligations of 
scholarly integrity.     
 
  II.  Contrasts between Scholars and Other Interested Parties and Lawyers for 
Clients 
 
Issues about the standards that law professors should apply in determining 
whether to sign scholars= briefs may begin to crystalize if we think of distinctions or 
contrasts along both of two dimensions.   One involves a comparison of law professors 
with other organizations and individuals in whose names amicus briefs are filed.  The 
other involves a juxtaposition with lawyers who author briefs, including amicus briefs, on 
behalf of individuals or organizations other than themselves. 
                                                 
25 See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text.  But cf. Lynch, supra note __, at 53 (reporting 
that some Supreme Court law clerks “recounted a wariness of amicus briefs filed by large groups 
of law professors”).  Even when scholars’ briefs are not substantively distinctive, perhaps they 
give assurance to some judges or Justices that a number of experts in the relevant field believe that 
a particular result might actually be compelled by, or at least would fit into without too much 
disrupting, the overall fabric of the law.  It is sometimes said that judges and Justices are 
influenced by elite opinion.  See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: 
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 6 (2004); LUCAS A. POWE, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE, 1789-2008 ix (2009).  Perhaps it matters to them, 
consciously or subconsciously, how legal elites line up.  If scholars’ briefs provide a good measure 
of anything, it may be how particular decisions would likely fare in subsequent academic 
commentary.   
26 See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme 
Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 830 (2000); Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the 
Influence of Amicus Curiae Participation in the U.S. Supreme Court, 38 L. & SOC’Y REV. 807, 822 (2004).  
Kearney & Merrill summarize their leading findings as follows: “that amicus briefs supporting respondents 
enjoy higher success rates that do amicus briefs supporting petitioners; that small disparities of one or two 
briefs for one side with no briefs on the other side may translate into higher success rates but larger 
disparities do not; that amicus briefs cited by the Court appear to be no more likely to be associated with 
the winning side than briefs not cited by the Court; and that amicus briefs filed by more experienced 
lawyers may be more successful than briefs filed by less experienced lawyers.”  
In crude summary, the literature divides into two camps in accounting for how amicus briefs 
achieve influence.  Some scholars hypothesize that courts care about, and that amicus briefs signal, how 
various potentially affected constituencies view disputed legal issues.  See id. at 785 (summarizing but not 
endorsing the interest-group theory view that “[t]he fact that the organization saw fit to file the brief is the 
important datum, not the legal argument or the background information set forth”).  The other theory holds 
that amicus briefs achieve influence by providing information and arguments that the parties do not supply.  
See, e.g., Simard, supra note __, at 682, 690-91.  Kearney & Merrill’s empirical study of Supreme Court 
cases involving amicus briefs finds some support for the former theory but more for the latter, see Kearney 
& Merrill, supra, at 830, as does Collins, supra, at 822. 
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A.  Grounds of Interest in the Outcome of Litigation 
 
Should law professors, in filing amicus briefs, feel subject to any argumentative 
constraints that would not apply to other amici curiae?  In weighing this question, it may 
help to consider how law professors who participate in scholars’ briefs represent 
themselves to a court and how their representation compares with that offered by other 
parties on whose behalf amicus briefs are filed.  Before filing a brief in the Supreme 
Court, a would-be amicus curiae who does not have the unanimous consent of the parties 
must seek leave to do so.
27  And in seeking leave, would-be filers must disclose the 
nature of their Ainterest@ in the case.
28  Amici curiae in the courts of appeals must always 
include a statement of their interests.
29  Perhaps what law professors owe the court when 
they submit scholars’ briefs depends partly on what they represent to the court in their 
statements of interest. 
 
Some parties seeking leave to file amicus briefs have, and assert, material or 
financial interests in the outcome of litigation.  The assertion of a material interest signals 
that a party=s brief will offer zealous but self-interested advocacy.  Law professors filing 
scholars= briefs obviously stand on a different footing, which they hope and expect that a 
court will bear in mind when assessing their arguments.  Many if not most scholars’ 
briefs begin with assertions that the amici have no material interest in the outcome and 
that their sole interest involves the proper development of the law.  Even absent such 
assertions, representations of expertise and disinterestedness typically seem implicit.
30 
                                                 
27 See Sup. Ct. R. 37. 
28See id. 
29 Fed. R. App. Proc. 29. 
30 There may be a few cases in which law professors have material interests or close analogues thereto—for 
example, cases involving tenure or pension rights.  In such cases, I see no reason why groups of law 
professors could not participate in amicus briefs in which they declared their material interests and in which 
counsel presented any available argument permitted under applicable rules of legal ethics.  But it would be 
misleading for the participants in such a brief to designate themselves as legal scholars seeking 
disinterestedly to promote integrity in the development of the law.  Cases presenting more complex issues 
about whether and to what extent law professors filing amicus briefs would implicitly present themselves as 
disinterested would be ones that arguably affect their capacity to function effectively as scholars and 
teachers.  Examples would include those involving rights relating to teaching, scholarship, and the 
confidentiality of academic communications. See, e.g.,University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 192 
(1992) (ruling that the First Amendment does not shield universities’ peer review files from disclosure in 
employment discrimination cases).  In such cases, law professors may possess special insights gained from 
experience, but they are unlikely to be disinterested, and the reader of an amicus brief by law professors 
could not reasonably think otherwise.  In my view, a similar analysis applies to the multiple amicus briefs 
filed by law professors in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 
(2006), which held that a statute requiring law schools to provide equal access to military recruiters despite 
the military’s then-applicable “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy did not violate the schools’ rights to freedom of 
speech and association.  Most of the briefs sought recognition of rights for the institutions at which the 
amici taught and with which their interests were aligned.  A brief on behalf of forty faculty members at 
Harvard Law School, which I joined, argued that the even-handed enforcement of an anti-discrimination 
policy against military recruiters along with all other recruiters actually did not violate the statute in 
question when that statute was properly interpreted and that there was, accordingly, no need for the 
Supreme Court even to reach the constitutional question in the case.  See Brief of William Alford et al., 
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Another possible ground of interest for a group or individual that wants to file an 
amicus brief involves political or ideological commitments.  Examples come from such 
organizations as the Sierra Club, the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Rifle 
Association, and the Heritage Foundation.  Although there are obvious differences 
between organizations such as these and relatively ad hoc collections of law professors, 
there are similarities, too.  In the constitutional law and federal courts cases in which I am 
asked to participate in scholars= briefs, many of the issues are politically charged.  Once 
again, however, I am quite sure that most law professors filing scholars= briefs would 
vehemently deny that the reason a court should listen to them relates to their political 
ideologies.
31  To the contrary, the reason to claim scholarly or professorial status through 
a designation such as Ascholars= brief@ is to represent oneself as having a distinctive 
expertise that depends on notions of integrity that are internal to the scholarly enterprise.  
Someone claiming scholarly expertise thus sets herself apart from those seeking to 
participate in a case based on ideological interests.  Professors who join scholars’ briefs 
aim to engender distinctive, role-based expectations concerning the character of their 
participation.  
 
B.  Contrasts Between Scholars= Ethical Obligations and Those of Lawyers 
for Clients 
 
In contrasting law professors whose names appear on scholars= briefs with 
lawyers acting as advocates for clients, I take it for granted that law professors who are 
members of the bar are entitled to engage in client representation.  Although it is possible 
to imagine arguments that the role of the law professor is somehow inherently 
incompatible with that of an advocate for clients, law schools are professional schools, 
and virtually no one believes that law professors should distance themselves so far from 
the legal profession.
32  I further assume—for reasons that I shall explain more fully 
below—that law professors who engage in client representation have ethical obligations 
to engage in zealous advocacy that may not only permit, but actually compel, them to 
                                                                                                                                                 
2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 630.  In my view, the first two sentences of the section of that brief headed 
“Interests: The Interest of Amici Curiae” implicitly acknowledged that the signatories sought to promote 
goals that had their origin outside the law and that the amici did not pretend to offer purely disinterested 
scholarly expertise: “Amici are full-time faculty members at Harvard Law School.  We are deeply 
committed to a fundamental moral principle: ‘A society that discriminates based on sexual orientation—or 
that tolerates discrimination by its members—is not a just society.’”  Id.  But see Richard A. Posner, A Note 
on Rumsfeld v. FAIR and the Legal Academy, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 52 (asserting that “the professors 
were not parties to Rumsfeld v. FAIR and so a reader of their amicus curiae brief might expect the views 
expressed in it to represent their best professional judgment on the meaning of the Solomon Amendment” 
and further opining that “the Harvard professors’ statutory argument bordered on the frivolous”).  
31 Cf. Voices for Choices v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 544 (2003) (Posner, J.) (“[T]he filing of an 
amicus brief is often an attempt to inject interest group politics into the federal appeals process.”).  
32 I do, however, know of a number of law professors who refuse to do consulting work on the ground that 
it might influence or give the appearance of influencing the views that they take in their scholarship and 
teaching.  The more standard view, which I share, is that not all client representation poses these risks.  For 
discussion of the possibility that some does, see infra. 
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33  But 
professors who join amicus briefs either present themselves as clients, whose interests the 
lawyers formally designated as counsel represent, or in a complex mixture of the roles of 
lawyer and client.  In either case, law professors joining scholars= briefs claim a 
distinctive interest in having the court resolve a case correctly as measured by legal 
standards that are at least partly independent of ideological views or preferences.   
 
Law professors considering whether to join scholars= briefs thus cannot claim that 
they can ethically conscientiously join any brief that a lawyer representing a client could 
ethically conscientiously sign.  When law professors present themselves as scholars, it 
becomes relevant that standards of integrity in scholarship differ from those applicable to 
legal advocacy by lawyers on behalf of clients.
34   
 
The standards of integrity applicable to lawyers representing clients typically have 
canonical statements in codes of professional responsibility or professional ethics.
35  
With respect to scholarly integrity, it is harder to find canonical statements of undou
authority.  Many universities have ethical codes.  The American Association of 
University Professors adopted a Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and 
Tenure in 1940
bted 
                                                
36 and a Statement of Professional Ethics in 1966 that was revised by the 
Association=s Council in 1987 and 2009.
37  In addition, the Association of American Law 
Schools has issued a Statement of Good Practices by Law Professors in the Discharge of 
Their Ethical and Professional Responsibilities, most recently amended in 2003, albeit 
with the proviso that it is not intended to function as “a disciplinary code.”
38  In 
contrasting standards of integrity for lawyers with those applicable to scholars, I rely 
partly on the AAUP and AALS statements, but even more on what I take to be 
understandings that are, and in my view ought to be, widely shared among law 
professors.  My methodological assumptions here are thus Ainterpretive@ in Professor 
Dworkin=s sense of that term
39:  My conclusions reflect a conscientious but contestable 
and potentially controversial effort to identify principles that would explain and support 
practices by law professors and others in judging legal scholarship and the performance 
of those who produce it. 
 
 
33 For further discussion of this assumption, see infra note __ and accompanying text. 
34 I put to one side all questions involving the obligations of lawyers who are not law professors in all roles 
other than client representation.  In many roles—including that of expert witness, for example—a 
practicing lawyer’s obligations of integrity may be identical to those of a law professor in producing legal 
scholarship.  But there may, or may not, be differences in some other roles.  I put aside questions of 
lawyers’ obligations in roles other than that client representation not because they are uninteresting or 
unimportant, but because they are too multifarious and far-ranging for me to address in this article. 
35 See, e.g., American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct (2010). 
36 Available at http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/EBB1B330-33D3-4A51-B534-
CEE0C7A90DAB/0/1940StatementofPrinciplesonAcademicFreedomandTenure.pdf. 
37 Available at 
http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/policydocs/contents/statementonprofessionalethics.htm.. 
38 Available at http://www.aals.org/about_handbook_sgp_eth.php. 
39 See R. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note __, at 45-86. 
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applicable to lawyers representing clients and those applicable to law professors in their 
capacity as scholars.  In my view, three have special significance. 
 
First, a legal scholar presenting scholarly conclusions assumes individual 
responsibility for having authored any writing that she publishes under her name and for 
having done the research or performed the analysis on which her stated conclusions 
depend.
40  This seems an important point of contrast with lawyers, who can rely on other 
lawyers to draft briefs that they sign. 
 
Admittedly, specifying the precise norms of responsibility to which scholars are 
subject involves many complications.  Of course a scholar can build on published work 
by others without having to re-do the research herself.  In the view of scholars in other 
fields, legal scholarship characteristically includes excessive, unnecessary citations to 
prior, supporting literature.
41  If nothing else, the prevailing norm with respect to 
citations helps enforce law professors’ obligation to rely only on sources that they believe 
credible after duly diligent examination. 
                                                
 
Similarly, no one doubts that a scholar can depend on the work of research 
assistants, including work done by them to document the truth of at least some claims.  I 
behaved ethicallyBor so I believeBwhen I once trusted a research assistant to determine 
how many states have anti-abortion laws on their books that would become immediately 
operative if the Supreme Court overruled Roe v. Wade.
42  Having received his report, I 
presented the information that he had discovered without repeating his 50-state search.
43  
I offer this example because it may indicate that the precise scope of permissible reliance 
on research assistants is unquestionably debatable.  Some may think I failed to do all that 
I responsibly ought to have done.  I also know of colleagues who place further reliance 
on research assistants than I do and, in my judgment, go too far.  Nevertheless, a vast 
terrain of the clearly impermissible bounds the zone of reasonable disagreement.  I cannot 
ask a research assistant to write an article and then present it as my own. What is more, I 
trust research assistants at my peril.  Any failure by a research assistant on whose work I 
rely is one for which I must accept responsibility.  
 
Co-authorship introduces yet another complexity, the relevant details of which 
may vary from one academic discipline to another.  I do not presume to speak, for 
example, of scientific publications resulting from research conducted by large teams.  In 
 
40 “Responsibility” is a complex, multifaceted concept.  See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 
102-04 (2011).  My use of the term corresponds most nearly to what Dworkin calls “intellectual 
responsibility.”  See id. at 102 (“A scientist who does not check his calculations lacks intellectual 
responsibility.”)  But I believe that the obligation of a scholar to make only such assertions as she is able to 
support with research or personal analysis includes elements of what Dworkin calls “ethical” and “moral” 
responsibility.  See id. at 102-03.   
41 See, e.g., Laura Kalman, The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the New Deal, 110 AM. HIST. REV. 
1052, 1074 (2005).  
42 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
43 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., If Roe Were Overruled: Abortion and the Constitution in a Post-Roe World, 
51 ST. LOUIS. U. L.J. 611, 614 (2007).  
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testify publicly to one another=s scholarly capacity and integrity.  In co-authoring an 
article or book, I can rely on my co-author to have done trustworthy research, not all of 
which I have necessarily performed myself.  But I would be grievously at fault for 
choosing a co-author who was not intellectually trustworthy to conform to high scholarly 
standards.  Upon reflection, I also believe that when co-authors divide the work for 
collaborative projects, they should be as forthcoming as reasonably possible about who 
takes principal responsibility for what.  In the past, I have not always satisfied this 
standard myself, and I do not claim that it is widely recognized, even with respect to 
casebooks, in which it is common for one co-author to do most or all of the work for 
some chapters and another co-author for others.  Be that as it may, in cases involving co-
authorship, a legal scholar implicitly represents that if she has not done adequate work to 
support all of the claims and conclusions that her book or article presents, then her co-
author has, and that she has a sound basis in personal knowledge for choosing to trust her 
co-author.  
 
Second, when a scholar publishes a book or article, she is subject to a norm of 
trustworthiness, which demands that she sincerely believe all of her claims or arguments 
and that she state them in ways not intended to mislead her readers about their relation to 
other arguments or evidence.
44  In order to advance an argument on one point, a scholar 
cannot make claims that she would disavow or recant in another context with the 
explanation that she made the contrary assertions only for the instrumental purpose of 
persuading a particular audience and that she had never really believed what she said. 
 
To clarify the scope of what is at stake here, it may help to draw an admittedly 
wobbly but nevertheless useful distinction between claims purporting to report what I 
shall call the “plain truth” and those that reflect more normatively influenced 
judgments.
45  As I shall use the term, statements of plain truth are true (if they are true at 
all) as a matter of fact on which all fully informed observers in a particular social context 
could be expected to agree
46—or, if they did not agree, should think that they needed to 
                                                 
44 For a somewhat different account of trustworthiness, but one that has influenced both my use of the 
concept and some of my normative analysis in this essay, see W.T. Jones, Public Roles, Private Roles, and 
Differential Moral Assessments of Role Performance, 94 ETHICS 603, 607 (1984) (characterizing 
“trustworthiness” as the distinctive virtue of private as distinguished from public roles, in which the 
principal virtue is “effectiveness”).  
45 The concept of truth is marvelously perplexing.  See generally Michael Glanzberg, Truth, STANFORD 
ENCYC. PHIL. (2009).  Among the difficulties with developing any deep distinction between what I am 
calling “plain” truth and other more commonly contested claims of truth, what counts as a “fact” may 
depend on theory-laden assumptions, there may be irreducible indeterminacies in attempts to “translate” 
assertions made in one language into another language, and the distinction between “analytical” or logical 
claims and those of asserted empirical fact may be unstable.  I do not believe that these deep complications 
threaten my suggestion that for nearly all everyday purposes we have no difficulty in identifying matters of 
plain truth on which all informed and competent people ought to agree. 
46 So used, the notion of plain truth encompasses both what JOHN SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 34-35 (1969) characterizes a “brute facts,” which do not depend on social 
conventions or practices, and “institutional facts,” which do.    
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47  In law, these include such 
matters as the text of the Constitution, statutes, and judicial opinions; many historical 
facts pertinent to legal analysis; and at least some elements of descriptions of what courts 
and other authorities—including empirical, scientific, and social scientific studies—have 
said, held, or established. 
 
By contrast with matters of plain truth, many assertions about how legal questions 
ought to be resolved as a matter of law in light of pre-existing authorities predictably and 
understandably arouse disagreement.  Often, if not always, such disagreement reflects 
divergent views about which outcome would be normatively best.   Disagreement of this 
kind can involve both the appropriate “interpretation” of authorities
48 and the best 
“implementation” of general norms via doctrinal tests and judicially manageable 
standards (to take just two examples).
49  Nevertheless, the fact of disagreement does not 
exclude the possibility that some conclusions can be better supported or better reasoned 
than others.  Among other things, good legal arguments need to identify and reckon 
honestly with a sometimes broad range of pertinent authorities. 
 
 With respect to matters of plain truth, lawyers filing briefs and making arguments 
to courts have obligations of truth-telling that are similar if not identical to those of 
scholars.
50  With respect to interpretive matters or those otherwise calling for an exercise 
of judgment, I think it is and ought to be widely accepted that a scholar asserting 
conclusions should have done her conscientious best to weigh all relevant considerations 
and to reach a judgment that she is prepared sincerely to defend as supported by the 
overall balance of reasons.
51  By contrast, lawyers arguing on behalf of clients need not 
certify their personal, good faith belief that their arguments are more accurate or 
persuasive than other available arguments.
52  The lawyer who represents a client plays a 
role in which all informed observers understand that she does not pretend to speak as a 
disinterested seeker after truth or sincere believer in all that she says.  Indeed, a lawyer 
would be derelict in her professional obligations if she failed to make the legally 
colorable arguments that would give her clients the best chance to prevail merely because 
she had determined that a judge would err in accepting them. 
                                                 
47 For example, someone who holds the view that (what others call) the Fourteenth Amendment is not 
really part of the Constitution because it was not properly ratified ought to know she should explain if 
asserting as a matter of fact to someone who was otherwise uninformed about the matter that only two 
Amendments were adopted during the Reconstruction era. 
48 See R. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note __, at 225-75. 
49 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 36-42 (2001). 
50 See ABA Model Code of Professional Conduct, supra note ___, Rule 3.3 (“Candor Toward the 
Tribunal”). 
51 I do not mean to be making any controversial jurisprudential claim about how a legal scholar should 
assess the weight of any one reason in comparison with another.  Sometimes a scholar may conclude that 
preexisting authorities dictate a result that otherwise would be undesirable; sometimes the overall balance 
of reasons may yield the conclusion that current doctrine should be changed.   My only claim is that legal 
scholars should assert only such judgments as they can sincerely defend under whatever jurisprudential 
assumptions they embrace. 
52 A lawyer may owe obligations of trustworthiness to her clients that she does not owe to those whom she 
addresses in her capacity as a representative of the client.  I speak here only of the lawyer’s responsibilities 
in the latter role. 
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Third, norms of scholarly integrity applicable to legal scholarship include an 
obligation—which partly overlaps that of integrity and might even be subsumed by it if 
integrity were sufficiently capaciously construed—that I shall call confrontation.  The 
confrontation norm requires scholars to be candid in acknowledging difficulties with their 
arguments by confronting the most significant possible non-obvious objections to their 
analyses.  Implicitly, at least, scholars publishing books and articles represent that they 
have not covered up any pertinent facts bearing on issues of plain truth. But I believe that 
the obligation goes further.  A scholar should not fail to acknowledge counter-arguments 
that others reasonably might find telling if they knew or thought of them.
53  What is 
more, a scholar should put the counterarguments as clearly and as fairly as she can before 
explaining why she ultimately finds them unpersuasive. 
 
Once again, many complexities surround this point.  No legal scholar invariantly 
satisfies all scholarly ideals to the fullest extent.  Even when trying our best, we all are 
fallible.  Some otherwise creditable scholars may fail to see the force of objections 
because they have not framed them clearly and imaginatively, even in their own minds.   
No one is excluded from the category of “legal scholar” as a result of having failed to 
fulfill the “confrontation” norm, or the others either, to the greatest possible degree.  
Nevertheless, the best scholarship distinguishes itself partly by displaying depth and 
sophistication in meeting the hardest challenges head-on.  And any willful concealment 
of difficulties is seriously culpable. 
 
Another strong contrast with lawyers authoring briefs emerges here.  Although 
lawyers cannot misrepresent the plain truth, and should divulge to the court any 
authorities “directly adverse to the position of the client,”
54 they do not need to reveal 
what they may regard as other vulnerabilities in their arguments.  Doing so may often be 
good tactics.  Good lawyers will frequently want to anticipate counter-arguments in order 
to refute them.  But whether to do so is a tactical question, not one involving moral or 
ethical obligations of trustworthiness or confrontation. 
 
Before concluding this discussion of contrasts between the obligations of scholars 
and those of lawyers writing briefs, I should say a special word about so-called 
“advocacy scholarship,” in which an author attempts to craft an argument expressly 
aimed at persuading courts or at furnishing a template for  practicing lawyers involved in 
litigation.  Even in this case, the contrast between scholars and lawyers for clients holds.  
To be sure, a professor writing an article in the advocacy genre may both cast and 
understand herself as performing a function unlike that of pure truth-seekers on faculties 
of arts and sciences.  Nevertheless, scholarly norms such as those that I identified above 
remain unavoidable, even though they of course may be satisfied to greater or lesser 
degree.  If a law professor who publishes an “advocacy” article in a law review cannot 
take personal responsibility for the underlying research and analysis, she has no business 
labeling the article as her own.  If she will not vouch for at least the minimal 
                                                 
53 See AALS, Statement of Good Practices by Law Professors, Sec. II (“Responsibilities As Scholars”), 
supra note __, (“Relevant evidence and arguments should be addressed.”). 
54 ABA Model Rule 3.3(a)(2). 
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to her conclusions.  And if she does not identify and confront difficulties in her 
arguments, she puts those who credulously embrace them at risk of being caught in future 
argumentative traps from which they may not know how to escape.
55 
 
Thus, when measured against all three of the contrasts that I have now drawn 
between the obligations of scholars and those of lawyers writing briefs, requests to sign 
amicus briefs often put strains on standards of scholarly integrity.  In saying so, however, 
I of course refer to the standards applicable to scholars writing books and articles.  
Nothing that I have said yet conclusively rules out the possibility that law professors 
should conform to different standards when writing or deciding whether to join amicus 
briefs.  
 
  III.  Law Professors’ Role-Based Obligations 
 
Much of my analysis so far has assumed the relevance of role-based morality: 
Moral obligations and ethical constraints sometimes vary with the role in which a person 
acts.
56   To recur to the contrast between practicing lawyers and law professors, lawyers 
who have assumed responsibilities of client representation are subject to one set of 
constraints, scholars publishing journal articles to another.  On the one hand, a lawyer has 
special obligations to her clients.  On the other, once the role of the lawyer has become 
settled enough to establish expectations concerning lawyers= duties of zealous 
representation, we cannot reasonably accuse a lawyer of behaving dishonestly or 
betraying a court=s trust by offering arguments that she believes unpersuasive.  
 
The latter point merits pausing over.  Although it is easy to see how roles can 
create obligations that would not otherwise exist, it may be more difficult to explain how 
roles can render permissible what otherwise would be impermissible.  Surely the role of 
Mafioso cannot create a permission to commit murder.  Similarly, some think that 
lawyers commit moral wrongs by pressing arguments that they know or believe to be 
fallacious.
57  But there is an important distinction between the Mafioso and the lawyer.  
The purported “role” of the Mafioso has no plausible moral justification.  By contrast, I 
assume the adversary system to be a reasonably just mechanism for the resolution of legal 
                                                 
55 A similar analysis should apply to scholarship that stakes out provocative positions in part simply to be 
provocative—for example, by attacking an assumption that has largely escaped challenge or by making the 
best possible case for an intriguingly counterintuitive idea.  A law professor who sets out to be provocative 
may test the outer limits of trustworthiness, but surely cannot ignore or escape this constraint.  A writer in 
this mode is, moreover, as bound as any other legal scholar by obligations of personal responsibility for 
what she writes and will be judged for compliance with scholarly norms requiring confrontation of non-
obvious difficulties in arguments.  
56 The point should not be overstated.  Among other things, “[r]ole is not a well-defined and well-
developed moral idea, and we shall have to make do with some sloppiness around the edges.”  ARTHUR 
ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE MORALITY OF ROLES IN PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE 
46 (1999). 
57 See A. APPLBAUM, supra note __, at 109 (“Roles do not overwrite moral prohibitions with moral 
permissions.”). 
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58  If so, then the 
roles that the adversary system creates—like those created by other reasonably just 
institutions—can confer at least some moral permissions.
59  To take the plainest 
examples of reasonably just institutions making permissible what otherwise w
impermissible, the legal system can convert what otherwise would be theft into taxation 
and what otherwise would be kidnapping into conscription or criminal incarceration.  In 
sum, above some threshold of institutional justification, the definition of moral wrongs, 
as well as entitlements, often depends partly on the structure of social institutions that 
might be otherwise.
ould be 
                                                
60  
 
 Against the background of role-based morality, an obvious question is whether 
there is a relevant, well-defined social role of Asigner of scholars= briefs@ that reflects and 
generates justified public expectations of what one permissibly can and cannot do in that 
capacity.  If there were such a role, and if the obligations and constraints that define it 
had adequate justification, then I assume it would be morally acceptable for a law 
professor to act within it.  Although I shall say more about this possibility below, I think 
it plain enough that no well-recognized and morally defensible role of “law professor as 
signer of scholars’ briefs” has yet emerged.  Moreover, even if some or possibly many 
law professors now think themselves justified in joining any briefs that they could sign as 
lawyers representing clients or submit as representatives of organizations with 
ideologically defined missions, it would still be possible, at this stage, to reject that 
conclusion as mistaken if it were too out of joint with other, better supported judgments 
about law professors= role-based obligations. 
 
Again, however, I do not mean to be too quick to reach ultimate conclusions.  In 
assessing how law professors ought to think about whether and when to join scholars’ 
briefs, it will help, next, to reflect briefly on the general character of moral and ethical 
standards and on the norms applicable to other roles that law professors occupy (such as 
those of author of scholarly books and articles, teacher, and lawyer for clients).   Having 
done so, we will be better situated to gauge the obligations of law professors who are 
asked to sign scholars’ briefs in light of both a general view of the nature of moral and 
ethical obligation and specific, grounded judgments about law professors’ obligations in 
other roles. 
 
A.  Moral and Ethical Constraints 
 
In ordinary parlance, the terms Amoral@ and Aethical@ are typically used 
interchangeably.  Philosophers, however, sometimes distinguish morality from ethics—
or, perhaps more precisely, they treat “morality” as having narrower and broader senses, 
 
58 See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 92-93 (1988) (justifying the adversary 
system on the “pragmatic” grounds that we need a system of adjudication, that the adversary system does a 
reasonably good job of finding truth and individual rights, that no rival would be clearly superior, and that 
the adversary system is the one that we happen to have).    
59 Luban, supra note __, at 132-33, 138, argues forcefully that where the justification for an institution and 
the roles that is creates is relatively weak, the potential exists for conflicts between role-based and ordinary 
moral obligations, and that in the case of such conflicts, the latter need not always prevail. 
60 See supra note __ and accompanying text. 
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61  
When morality and ethics are so distinguished, morality, in the narrower sense, refers to 
the domain of what we owe to each other.
62  Ethics, by contrast, refers to the domain of 
standards bearing on how we ought to live in order to lead good or worthy lives.
63  The 
recognition of a domain of ethics distinct from that of morality has greatest pertinence if 
we assume that we are entitled to make judgments concerning how to live that are not 
dictated in every particular by the obligations that we owe to others as a matter of 
impersonal morality. 
 
Following Thomas Nagel, I believe that morality—here using the term in the 
narrower sense—involves two kinds of demands that can sometimes exist in tension, and 
possibly conflict, with one another.
64  One set of demands reflects the significance of 
consequences.
65  If we can realize highly desirable consequences at relatively little cost 
to ourselves, or avert significant harms to others, then we ought to do so.  The other set o
demands or constraints, which are often characterized as Adeontological,@ involves duties 
to others that are specified independently of the good that we might accomplish or the 
harm we might avert.
f 
                                                
66  Many if not most of these demands manifest themselves in 
constraints on the ways that we can permissibly treat other people.  For example, it is 
normally wrong to inflict harm deliberately on people or lie to them or betray their trust 
even when we might achieve some otherwise good end by doing so.  In a hypothetical 
case much discussed by philosophers, a doctor cannot permissibly kill one patient in 
order to harvest organs that could save five others.
67  
 
Although the claims of consequentialist and deontological morality can apply to 
everyone in all facets of life, the precise nature and relative strength of their claims can 
vary with the role that one occupies.  Nagel says that the more public the role, the larger 
the claims of concerns about consequences.
68  A president may permissibly order the lies 
and betrayal that espionage requires, and a spy in the service of a nation at risk may lie 
and betray, with claims of deontological morality relaxing at least somewhat. 
 
The ethical question of how one ought to live is also richly multi-faceted.  There 
is no single right way for everyone.  For the most part, people who enter a morally 
permissible profession or professional role should, as an ethical matter, attempt to 
perform well in that role.  When roles are in flux, or no stable social understanding 
establishes how those acting in the role can reasonably be expected to perform, it may be 
an ethical question, as well as a moral one, how to construe or interpret the role or how to 
act within it. 
 
61 See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note __, at 13-15, 25, 150; BERNARD WILLIAMS, 
ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 174-96 (1985). 
62 See R. DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note __, at 13-15. 
63 See id. 
64 See, e.g., Thomas Nagel’s, War and Massacre, Ruthlessness in Public Life, and The Fragmentation of 
Value, all reprinted in THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS (1979).   
65 See T. NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS, supra note __, at 54, 83.  
66 See id.  See also THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE (1986).  
67 See, e.g., T.M. SCANLON, MORAL DIMENSIONS: PERMISSIBILITY, MEANING, BLAME 15 (2008).  
68 See T. NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS, supra note __, at 83-85.  
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And, as I have suggested, there can also be ethical questions concerning which 
roles or sub-roles one ought to occupy or perform.  For example, I am a law professor, 
which seems to me to represent an ethically defensible choice of vocation.  But that 
vocation leaves many further choices open.  In common with other law professors, I 
routinely confront issues about whether, for example, to spend more of my professional 
time on teaching or scholarship, on scholars’ briefs, on paid or unpaid consulting work, 
or on non-scholarly publications.  In these as in many matters, the line between morals 
and ethics may prove fuzzy in some cases.  It is largely up to me to decide how best to 
allocate my professional time, but some choices could breach obligations that I owe to 
others, including judges, my law school, and my students.  Other choices, even if they did 
not violate obligations that I strictly owe to others, might be ethically poor ones. 
 
B.  Professors= Roles 
 
As I have recognized, law professors are not just scholars.   The law professor is 
poised between the academy and the profession.  If we think about the variety of roles 
that law professors play, perhaps we can make further progress toward identifying the 
moral and ethical constraints that bear specifically on their participation in scholars= 
briefs.
69  This approach will facilitate reasoning by analogy and permit a checking of 
tentative judgments in one domain against judgments and the principles that support them 
in other domains.  Relevant roles include these: 
 
Author of scholarly publications.  Above I discussed some of the moral and 
ethical obligations of and constraints on law professors doing legal scholarship.
70  
Among other things, that discussion emphasized what I characterized as special 
obligations of responsibility, trustworthiness, and confrontation.  In publishing 
scholarship, a law professor creates expectations among readers that she then owes it to 
them to fulfill.
71  It is hard to imagine how anyone could defend a set of norms for lega
scholarsBeven in wholly consequentialist termsBthat did not define the scholars= role to 
include stringent obligations of responsibility, trustworthiness, an
l 
d confrontation. 
                                                
 
Teacher.  Many of a law professor’s most clearly and stringently defined 
obligations involve teaching.
72  Professors must meet their classes, satisfy norms of 
professional conduct in the classroom, assign grades fairly and punctually, and much 
 
69 For a proposed set of “canons” applicable to some of these roles, see Robert B. McKay, Ethical 
Standards for Law Teachers, 25 ARK. L. REV. 44 (1971).  
70 AALS, Statement of Good Practices by Law Professors, supra note __, asserts in Section II, 
“Responsibilities as a Scholar,” that “law professors have a responsibility to engage in their own research 
and publish their conclusions.” 
71 See generally R. DWORKIN, HEDGEHOGS, supra note __, at 304 (identifying a “general moral 
responsibility: not to  harm other people by first encouraging them to expect that we will act in a certain 
way and then not acting in that way”).  
72 See Section I of AALS, Statement of Good Practices by Law Professors, supra note __ (addressing law 
professors’ “Responsibilities to Students”); Norman Redlich, Professional Responsibility of Law Teachers, 
29 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 623, 625-26 (1980).  
 
  21more.
73  Even beyond what appears in contractual or otherwise canonical statements of 
professorial obligations, obligations of responsibility, trustworthiness, and confrontation 
similar to those that attach to a law professor in the role of scholar apply to the role of 
teacher. 
 
Although there are many ways to teach well, successful teaching of any kind 
requires trust.  For a teacher to deserve trust, she must take personal responsibility for the 
accuracy or sincerity of what she says to her students (unless she makes clear, before or 
after the fact, that she is merely airing positions that deserve to be confronted) and should 
not cover up difficulties in her arguments.  The role of teacher carries especially 
enhanced obligations of trustworthiness in counseling students about what to do or 
believe. Once again, I cannot imagine a remotely plausible set of role specifications for 
law professors that did not require them to hold themselves out to their students as 
trustworthy and then to requite the trust that they encourage their students to place in 
them. 
 
Colleague.  In performing institutional service and otherwise acting as a 
colleague, a law professor owes strict obligations of responsibility, trustworthiness, and 
confrontation.  She should not assert propositions of what purport to be plain truth unless 
she reasonably and responsibly believes them to be true and should be sincere and 
forthcoming in offering arguments for or explanations of institutional decisions.  Law 
professors’ “paramount responsibilities” lie “within their institution[s],”
74 and these 
include obligations of institutional service and support for colleagues’ teaching and 
scholarship.
75 
 
Lawyer for clients.  I said above that a law professor representing a client has the 
sameBwhich is to say only theBobligations of responsibility, trustworthiness, and 
confrontation in asserting arguments on behalf of a client as does any other lawyer.  A 
law professor who becomes a lawyer for a client does not, of course, cease to be a law 
professor, any more than any human being who becomes a lawyer sheds her other roles 
and the moral obligations that attend them.  It is possible, moreover, for role-based 
obligations to come into conflict with one another.  Insofar as there would be conflicts 
between one’s obligations as a law professor and as a lawyer for a particular client, then 
one ought not take on the latter role
76—a matter that I shall discuss shortly.  But in cases 
in which a law professor morally and ethically permissibly acts as a lawyer for a client at 
all, I do not believe that the distinctive role-based obligations of a law professor conflict 
with or dilute the distinctive role-based obligations and permissions of a lawyer 
representing a client within the adversary system. 
                                                 
73 See Section I of AALS, Statement of Good Practices by Law Professors, supra note __ (addressing law 
professors’ “Responsibilities to Students”). 
74 AAUP, Statement of Professional Ethics, supra  note __, para. 5. 
75 See AALS, Statement of Good Practices by Law Professors, supra note __, Sec. III of which 
(“Responsibilities to Colleagues”) states that “[l]aw professors should make themselves reasonably 
available to colleagues for purposes of discussing teaching methods, content of courses, possible topics of 
scholarship, scholarly works in progress, and related matters.” 
76 See Redlich, supra note __, at 629 (urging law professors to show discretion in deciding which clients to 
accept). 
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This judgment rests on several admittedly contestable premises that I should 
attempt to clarify, even if I cannot defend them fully.  As I have said already, I assume 
that the adversary system is a reasonably just institution; that within the adversary 
system, the role of the lawyer is widely understood to be that of zealous advocate, rather 
than disinterested seeker after truth; and that clients within the adversary system are 
entitled to zealous advocates.  If so, one who opts into the role of zealous advocate within 
the adversary system undertakes obligations that at least normally overwrite otherwise 
applicable moral constraints that are inconsistent with the morally adequately justified 
obligations that the adversary system creates.  And I see nothing about the peculiar role 
of the law professor that would put law professors who engage in client representation 
into a different category. 
 
The intuitive support for this conclusion seems clearest if we think of the case of a 
law professor acting as a lawyer for an impecunious pro bono client.  Such a client ought 
not be disadvantaged because her lawyer is a law professor.  A law professor who could 
not represent the client as zealously as another morally and ethically conscientious lawyer 
ought not take on the representation.  This example may seem to omit a crucial 
complication in most actual cases.  Clients who seek law professors as counsel may hope 
to leverage the professors’ scholarly reputation—as something distinct from the 
professors’ legal skills and insights—into a tactical asset.
77  For example, the client may 
hope that the professor will possess unusual credibility.  But credibility with respect to 
what?  If lawyers who are not professors warrantee only that the positions that they take 
on behalf of their clients are legally tenable ones, not ones that they sincerely believe to 
be valid, it would be unreasonable to insist that a law professor arguing on behalf of a 
client should only assert claims that she would sincerely adjudge persuasive in her 
capacity as a scholar or teacher.  With respect to some issues, a professor may not even 
know which arguments she would find most persuasive if she had encountered them first 
in a context not involving client representation.  Perhaps more important, credibility is a 
crucial and potentially forfeitable asset for all lawyers, not just law professors, and it is 
by no means certain that a law professor will always enjoy an advantage over counsel for 
the other side.  In litigation involving complex legal issues, a lawyer’s credibility depends 
crucially on judges’ believing that she has a broad-ranging knowledge of the pertinent 
authorities and can be trusted to characterize them in ways that are not misleading.  
Measured against this standard, some practicing lawyers may begin a case with more 
credibility than some law professors.  And if assertions about particular authorities do not 
stand up when a judge or her law clerk personally examines them, a professor’s 
credibility will presumably dissolve as rapidly as that of a full-time practitioner. 
    
If law professors have the same obligations and permissions as other lawyers 
when acting in the role of client representative, it is a separate question, as I have 
indicated, whether there are possible moral and ethical constraints on a law professor’s 
becoming involved in client representation in particular cases.  Clearly a law professor 
                                                 
77 See Redlich, supra note __, at 629 (“Law teachers should also be aware that whenever they engage in 
outside practice, it is highly likely that some one … is benefiting from the professor’s affiliation with a law 
school.”). 
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obligations.  A further question is whether it is morally problematic for a law professor, 
because of her obligations of responsibility, trustworthiness, and confrontation in her 
roles as scholar and teacher, to represent particular clients or clients who want to argue 
particular positions.  With respect to this question, I believe that a law professor should 
feel morally obliged to say no to a request to represent a client in any case in which she 
thought that client representation would compromise her capacity to act with 
trustworthiness and to give forthright statements of her actual views in other rolesBfor 
example, because she might feel obliged to trim or alter the legal judgments expressed in 
future scholarship in order to retain the client=s business.
78  A law professor who 
compromised her scholarship in this way would violate obligations of professional 
priority that she owes to her law school and possibly of trustworthiness that she owes to 
those who read her scholarship.
79  
 
A further question is whether law professors ought to decline to represent 
particular clients or to argue particular positions, not because they would violate moral 
obligations to others by doing so, but because doing so is ethically unattractive.  In my 
view, a law professor need not refuse to represent all clients whose positions on the 
merits she would not agree with (in her role as a scholar or teacher), but she ought not 
represent clients whose positions, if adopted, would have a significantly adverse effect on 
the trajectory of the law=s development, as judged by the professor herself.   
                                                 
78 See generally Rory K. Little, Law Professors as Lawyers: Consultants, Of Counsel, and the Ethics of 
Self-Flagellation, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 345, 370 (2001) (“A real cost of outside expert consulting by law 
professors is that they may consciously decline to state strong opinions on some issues, for fear of 
providing material for their future impeachment … or losing business …. If a professor’s practice silences 
scholarship, it is an unmitigated bad for law professors and the profession.”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The 
Scholar as Advocate, 43 J. LEG. EDUC. 391, 393 (1993) (“There are reasons to question whether the 
academic views of legal scholars who do significant consulting are truly their own views, undistorted by 
the interests of their clients.”).  
79 See, e.g., AAUP, Statement of Professional Ethics, supra  note __, para. 5: “Professors give due regard to 
their paramount responsibilities within their institution in determining the amount and character of work 
done outside it.”  I also assume that a law professor should disclose any client representation or other paid 
relationships that others might reasonably think could influence her scholarly judgments or policy 
recommendations.  See AALS, Statement of Good Practices by Law Professors, supra note __: 
A law professor shall disclose the material facts relating to the receipt of direct or indirect 
payment for, or any personal economic interest in, any covered activity that the professor 
undertakes in a professorial capacity …. A law professor shall also disclose the fact that 
views or analysis expressed in any covered activity were espoused or developed in the 
course of either paid or unpaid representation of or consultation with a client when a 
reasonable person would likely see that fact as having influenced the position taken by 
the professor …. Covered activities include any published work, oral or written 
presentation in conferences, drafting committees, legislatures, law reform bodies and the 
like, and any expert testimony submitted in legal proceedings.  A law professor should 
make, to the extent possible, all disclosures discussed in this policy at the earliest possible 
time. 
A number of academic disciplines have codes of ethics mandating disclosures of this kind.  For an 
influential argument that the academic economists should be subject to formal disclosure mandates of this 
kind, see Gerald Epstein & Jessica Carrick-Hagenbarth, Financial Economists, Financial Interests and 
Dark Corners of the Meltdown: It’s Time to Set Ethical Standards for the Economics Profession, 
Workingpaper Series No. 239, Political Economy Research Institute, Univ. of Mass. Amherst (Oct. 2010). 
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A person who becomes a law professor adopts a role of reflecting thoughtfully 
and conscientiously on matters of legal policy and justice.  If her scholarship is not purely 
descriptive, she takes on the role of attempting to promote the understandings that would 
lead to the best legal outcomes as defined by irreducibly normative criteria.  A law 
professor who turned her back on that aspiration in a case involving substantial legal 
stakes that she herself recognizes, largely if not wholly to earn consulting dollars, would 
degrade and devalue her previously defining professional ethical choices, and sometimes 
those of her colleagues, in a way that a practicing lawyer arguing the same position in the 
same case would not.
80 
 
Advocate for law reform in ways other than client representation.  Law professors 
often perform both honorably and admirably as advocates for law reform.  If a law 
professor appears before members of Congress or a state legislature, we expect her to 
make arguments that will be accessible to and persuasive with an audience with limited 
time and attention and, one imagines, with limited patience for some kinds of rigorously 
scholarly analysis.   
 
Insofar as trustworthiness is concerned, it may suffice for a law professor not to 
misrepresent the facts or law or make fallacious or misleading claims.  When acting as an 
advocate for law reform, a law professor can surely present policy arguments without 
considering their relation to political and other arguments the politicians might care 
about.   
 
With respect to confrontation, it matters that a law professor acting as a reform 
advocate will frequently lack control of the forum in which she appears and must take her 
audience, which she has only a brief time to try to persuade, as she finds it.  Too much 
time devoted to exposing difficulties in her own argument could cause attempted 
advocacy not just to fail, but to backfire.  At the same time, it matters that the professor-
advocate is indeed a professor.  The professorial role—to which the professor-advocate is 
likely to appeal implicitly, if not explicitly, in her claim to credibility—generates 
expectations of adherence to unusually high standards of intellectual rigor and candor, 
even if those expectations may be to some extent defeasible, as in cases in which a law 
professor appears as a lawyer for a client.  Overall, the pinch is likely to feel tightest 
when a professor is asked to appear as a witness in a quasi-adversarial hearing in which 
she would be expected, on the one hand, to support the position of the side that has asked 
her to testify and, on the other hand, to speak with the integrity of a scholar, since it will 
inevitably be scholarly stature that results in a professor’s being called as a witness in the 
first place.  If a professor doubts that she can serve her cause effectively while also 
speaking honestly in response to challenges, then she should decline to testify. 
 
Other partly forum-defined roles.  Recognition that a law professor’s obligations 
can vary with the forum in which she appears invites attention to the nearly boundless 
                                                 
80 If there are law professors who purport to indifference about how any and all high-stakes cases ought to 
be resolved, their outlook is ethically impoverished and irresponsible. 
 
 
  25variety of fora in which law professors—identified as such—either speak or write.  To 
name just a few examples, these can include letters-to-the-editor columns, debates before 
organizations of different types, sundry convocations of students from kindergarteners to 
advanced degree candidates, and retirement celebrations or memorial services for 
colleagues.  Fora such as these pose diverse challenges.  Audiences vary in their capacity 
to follow complex, nuanced arguments.  Surely a law professor asked to speak about 
legal topics to grade-schoolers should not stand tongue-tied because young children 
cannot grasp the complexities that scholarly standards would demand in a law review 
article.  Nor should a law professor appraising a colleague’s teaching or scholarship in a 
retirement testimonial necessarily disclose all of the objections that critics might 
plausibly raise.   
 
Given the range of fora in which law professors appear, and the differences that 
attributes of these various fora may make for the standards of integrity that law professors 
ought to observe, anyone who set out to draft a moral or ethical rulebook would embark 
on a fool’s errand.  Whatever the forum, professors bear at least a strong presumptive 
obligation not to deviate from the plain truth.  When an audience reasonably expects a 
professor to satisfy high standards of scholarly trustworthiness and to identify and 
confront difficulties in her argument, the professor presumptively ought to do so, unless 
she clearly signals to her audience that she will justifiably play a non-scholarly role—as, 
for example, in a debate format in which a professor is asked to argue for a side in which 
she does not wholeheartedly believe.  But there may be lower expectations in fora in 
which law professors are expected and understood to opine quickly, without opportunity 
for careful research and reflection.  Blog postings may fall within this category.  Most 
lunch and dinner table conversations surely do. 
 
In thinking abut the obligations that law professors owe their audiences, there is 
no avoiding reference to reasonable expectations.  Although that reference is partly 
circular, some circularity is inevitable if we accept that social roles shape expectations 
and that we have a “general moral responsibility[] not to harm other people by first 
encouraging them to expect that we will act in a certain way and then not acting in that 
way.”
81  Think again of the law professor who is asked to pay tribute to a colleague at a 
retirement celebration or memorial service.   As a wise colleague once said to me, “a 
testimonial is not an affidavit,” and no one wants or expects it to be, even when it comes 
from a law professor with relevant professional expertise. 
 
  IV.  Standards for Law Professors Signing Scholars= Briefs and Expressing 
Collective Professorial Opinions 
 
It is now time to be concrete about standards that law professors ought to observe 
in deciding whether to sign a scholars= brief that someone else has prepared.  In this Part, 
I begin by making a few observations about the nature of a brief as a legal document.  By 
practically necessary implication, I argue, the form of a brief may require some 
adjustments in the role-based standards of integrity that I identified in Part II.B as 
governing the production of legal scholarship.  Against that background, I identify the 
                                                 
81 R. DWORKIN, HEDGEHOGS, supra note __, at 304. 
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to join, scholars’ briefs.  Finally, using the standards applicable to scholars’ briefs as a 
reference point, I discuss the norms of scholarly integrity that ought to apply when law 
professors are asked to sign joint letters offering purportedly expert legal analysis to non-
judicial decision makers. 
 
A.  The Nature of a Brief 
 
By traditional understanding, a brief is an advocacy document.  Briefs aim not 
merely to inform, but also to persuade.  Scholars who join in amicus briefs should 
therefore be understood as attempting persuasion.  Ideally, the law professors who sign 
such briefs would have conducted as impartial an inquiry as possible before arriving at 
their conclusions.  By identifying themselves as scholars in filing a brief, or as professors 
whose only interest lies in the optimal development of the law, signatories may implicitly 
represent that they have done so.  Nevertheless, a brief is not a scholarly article, nor does 
it speak to the same audience that scholarly articles address.  In light of these differences, 
it would seem unduly rigid to insist that the standards of scholarly integrity that apply to 
articles and books could simply carry over without amendment to scholars’ briefs. 
 
Admittedly, it would be possible to resist this conclusion even in the highly 
general terms in which I have stated it.  Scholars’ briefs are a species of amicus curiae 
brief, and one could imagine friends of the court who do not press a particular point of 
view, but simply aim to call attention to pertinent considerations that might otherwise 
escape the court’s notice.  Indeed, in the early decades of American history, self-
identified friends of the court played this role more frequently than they assumed the 
posture of advocates.
82  Although it is possible to imagine scholars’ briefs reverting to the 
older understanding, I see no reason to restrict law professors to so constrained a role.  
Law professors rightly want to influence the development of the law.  If law professors 
with general expertise in a field think that they have identified the best substantive 
resolution of an issue, they should feel free to say so, and—within limits yet to be 
identified—to make arguments designed to persuade a court to their point of view. 
 
A second relevant feature of briefs is that they must conform to stringent page or 
word limits.
83  Rarely if ever will law professors submitting an amicus curiae brief have 
the space to say all that they might wish to include if presenting their views in a scholarly 
book or article.  Those joining a scholars’ brief should therefore be able to trust courts 
and most other readers to understand that length limitations will necessitate some—as yet 
still unidentified—adjustment in the scholarly standards that journal articles and books 
should meet. 
 
Finally, briefs can be, and often are, submitted on behalf of multiple parties or 
amici curiae.  In order for groups to make collective statements, members must 
sometimes accommodate the views and preferences of others.   Accordingly, it should be 
                                                 
82 See Banner, supra note __. 
83 In the Supreme Court, for example, amici curiae briefs may not exceed 9,000 words.  See Sup. Ct. Rule 
33. 
 
  27widely understood that joint briefs do not necessarily reflect every nuance in the views of 
all or even any of their multiple signatories.  It is possible to make sincere affirmations 
about what the law is or ought to be without believing that those affirmations are as 
perspicuous, deep, or far-reaching as the subject matter would permit.
84  The readers of a 
joint brief, including a joint scholars’ brief, should therefore understand that the 
individual signatories might have framed their arguments, conclusions, and 
characterizations of authorities at least slightly differently if speaking for themselves 
alone.  As an ethical matter, however, I believe that law professors should maintain a 
critical and self-critical wariness of pressure and psychological dispositions to 
accommodate too much in order to be able to go along.  Law professors recurrently 
defend the institution of tenure as a crucial safeguard of the independent thinking that—
we familiarly say—our job requires.
85  Beyond a limit, accommodation in order to join 
the collective statements in a scholars’ brief fits uneasily with the ideal of law professors 
as rigorous independent thinkers. 
 
B.  Applying and Adjusting Scholarly Norms 
 
  In considering how the three standards that I identified above as binding on law 
professors when authoring scholarly books or articles should be altered or relaxed for 
scholars= briefs, I shall start with the third, which requires confrontation of difficulties in 
scholarly arguments.  This is the scholarly norm that most clearly requires adjustment.  
Appropriate alterations in other scholarly norms are much smaller. 
 
1.  Confrontation of Difficulties in Arguments 
 
Given length limitations on amicus briefs, no reasonable reader could expect 
scholars who must comply with such limitations to address all of the concerns and 
counterarguments that they would wish to discuss if not so constrained.  An analogy 
supports this conclusion.  The page-limited scholars who participate in amicus briefs 
occupy a role partly similar to that played by law professors who serve as expert 
witnesses.  Although expert witnesses must tell the truth as they see it, the legal rules that 
define the form in which they present their conclusions also mediate their obligations to 
confront potential objections to their arguments.  A witness can only answer the questions 
that lawyers ask.  A signatory to a brief is not quite so tightly constrained, but is entitled 
to prefer affirmative arguments to defensive qualifications in the page-limited role in 
which scholars who act as friends of the court cast themselves.
86 
                                                 
84 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995) 
(exploring the phenomenon of agreement on some matters or characterizations in the absence of deeper or 
further reaching agreement).  There is a partial analogy, though only a partially analogy, to judges multi-
member courts who sometimes compromise their views in order to make it possible for there to an “opinion 
of the court.”  There are more pressing institutional or role-based reasons for judges to agree to majority 
opinions of a court, and the legal clarity that such opinions provide, than for law professors to compromise 
their views in order to participate in a collective statements. 
85 See AAUP, Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, supra note __. 
86 There may be more grounds for worry on this score when amicus briefs present purportedly factual 
information at too late a stage in litigation for the opposing party “to digest the information, investigate its 
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2.  Individual, Research-Based Responsibility for Claims Asserted  
 
There should be less adjustment or relaxation in the standard that normally 
requires law professors to take personal responsibility for having done the research and 
performed the analysis on which their stated positions depend.  My argument in support 
of this conclusion is embarrassingly brief and direct: Law professors cannot honestly 
claim to speak as disinterested legal experts if they make assertions that lack significant 
foundations in personally conducted research and resulting knowledge.  Accordingly, law 
professors should not join scholars= briefs unless they have a basis in personal knowledge 
for affirming that all of the briefs= principal assertions of plain fact are true (or are 
appropriately assumed to be so for purposes of legal argument) and that all of the briefs= 
principal interpretive claims reflect their sincere views. 
 
Several qualifications are in order here.  In saying that a scholar should have a 
significant basis in personal knowledge for affirming all claims of plain truth, I do not 
suggest that law professors should not sign scholars= briefs unless they can personally 
remember every word quoted from every authority and the exact pages on which 
quotations appeared.  Even in a scholarly article or book, a law professor permissibly 
trusts research assistants to confirm or nail down many details.  Similarly, if a law 
professor has general familiarity with the main authorities cited in a scholars= brief, the 
professor should be able to trust the work of the brief=s author in reporting the more 
minute details.  But only if the representations are consistent with a law professor=s 
personal recollections of the principal authorities on which a brief relies, and if the 
professor has reason to trust the competence and good faith of the brief=s author(s), 
should a law professor sign in the self-asserted capacity of a scholar (or that of a 
professor advising the court based on scholarly expertise).  A professor signing an amicus 
brief should similarly accept personal responsibility for having thought through and 
endorsed the brief’s central interpretive and normative claims. 
 
An obvious question to be confronted here arises from an analogy to co-authored 
scholarship.  If a law professor can trust her co-authors to be accurate and analytically 
rigorous, why can she not similarly trust the author of a scholars’ brief, especially if it is 
written by a distinguished scholar whom she knows to be a person of integrity?  To give a 
concrete example, this question arose for me in connection with the scholars’ brief in the 
complex case about federal jurisdiction that I described in Part I.
87  The author was 
Michael Dorf, a scholar whom I hold in extremely high esteem and a person I believe to 
be of unimpeachable integrity.  If the occasion ever arose, I would have no qualms about 
embracing Dorf as a co-author. 
 
In the case of the scholars’ brief that he had drafted, however, it seems pertinent 
that my instinctive sympathy for the asserted position—and thus my impulse to want to 
sign—had ideologically based foundations.  In my view, when ideological interests or 
                                                                                                                                                 
reliability, and, if necessary, file a response or identify (and persuade) an amicus curiae to file a response 
on their behalf.”  Simard, supra note __, at 706. 
87 See supra note __ and accompanying text. 
 
  29political values provide a significant motivation for a law professor to participate in a 
scholars’ brief, she has, if anything, an enhanced obligation to ensure that the views that 
she espouses are sustainable when tested against the requirements of “integrity,” 
including “fit” or coherence with pertinent legal authorities.
88  As I said earlier, reflection 
persuades me that law professors who do not share personal responsibility for all aspects 
of a co-authored scholarly product (such as a casebook) should, insofar as possible, 
disclose who bears responsibility for what.  In principle, signatories to scholars’ briefs 
could take a similar approach, disclaiming personal responsibility for that of which they 
lack significant personal knowledge.  For example, I might have offered to join Professor 
Dorf’s amicus brief, subject to the inclusion of a disclaimer concerning the limits of my 
actual knowledge of the authorities on which the brief relied.  The practical difficulty, of 
course, is that too much too candid disclosure of this kind would defeat the very purpose 
that scholars’ briefs seek to achieve, which is to signal that the signatories have arrived at 
their conclusions based on disinterested legal expertise.   Nevertheless, for professors to 
join some parts of briefs while disclaiming responsibility for others would seem to me to 
be morally and ethically unexceptionable.   
 
3.  Trustworthiness in Asserting Arguments 
 
The last remaining scholarly norm on my list involved an obligation of sincerity 
and trustworthiness in asserting reasons and arguments for conclusions.  As framed by 
requests to sign scholars= briefs, the challenge may be to reconcile the scholar=s obligation 
of trustworthiness in argument with the law professor=s professionally approved mission 
as an advocate for legal justice or law reform.  I would propose this test: Before signing 
scholars= briefs, law professors should first ask themselves how they would respond, in 
their roles as scholars and teachers, if the court to which the brief is addressed simply 
adopted the brief=s reasoning and language as its own.  If a professor would applaud the 
court for doing so, she should have no compunctions about joining the brief.  At the other 
end of the spectrum, if the professor would criticize the court for relying on misleading 
characterizations of relevant authorities, purporting to distinguish precedents on 
untenable bases, or materially oversimplifying relevant history, then she normally ought 
to withhold her name.   
 
The example of the scholars’ brief in support of a federal statute 
mandating the purchase of health insurance, to which I referred in Part I, may help 
me elaborate, and perhaps partially qualify, this position.   In my judgment, the 
brief that I was asked to sign fell short of appropriately applicable standards by 
reciting only historical evidence that would tend to support the constitutionality of 
the challenged legislation as if that were the only relevant historical evidence.  
But I also believe that it normally is proper for law professors acting as friends of 
the court to provide any arguments or information that judges might think relevant 
or even dispositive, regardless of the significance that the amici themselves attach 
to it, as long as the amici present the information in trustworthy, non-misleading 
form. The scholars= brief on the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act would thus have satisfied my standards of trustworthiness if, 
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  30in addition to piling up evidence tending to indicate a very broad original 
understanding of the scope of the commerce powerBin the expectation that a court 
would find such information relevantBit had also very briefly said something such 
as this: 
 
To be sure, there is other evidence bearing on the original understanding, 
including some suggesting that many members of the Founding generation 
drew one or more clear linesBsuch as a line between commerce and 
manufacturingBthat sharply delimited Congress=s power.
89  In truth, there 
was probably no consensus among the Constitution=s framers and ratifiers 
concerning the precise scope and limits of the Commerce Clause or of 
how to reconcile competing assumptions that Article I would give 
Congress power to deal with all problems of genuinely national scope and 
that it would reserve some domains of regulatory authority exclusively to 
the states.
90  Certainly many who either numbered among or closely 
followed the Founding generationBincluding Chief Justice John Marshall 
in Gibbons v. Ogden
91Bunderstood the Commerce Clause as expansive in 
scope.
92  In any event, if it were ever plausible to hold that the Commerce 
Clause would best be understood to deny Congress the authority to 
address any significant subset of pressing economic problems that the 
states are separately incompetent to meet, post-Founding history and 
precedent make that conclusion no longer tenable.
93 
 
If a court incorporated language of this kind into its opinion, as part of a broader 
discussion, its analysis would satisfy applicable ideals of judicial integrity, just as a 
scholars= brief that included such language would uphold defensible scholarly standards 
of sincerity and trustworthiness.
94 
 
The harder cases under my proposed test involve situations in which a professor 
would approve a court’s adoption of a brief’s analysis if, but only if, she accepted what 
she regards as a mistaken premise or regrettable constraint.  Imagine, for example, that a 
professor believes that the truly best legal arguments would show the death penalty to be 
unconstitutional in all cases, but also recognizes that there is no realistic chance of 
persuading a court to adopt that view in the case before it.  Lower courts are bound by 
Supreme Court precedents, and a majority of the current Justices appear unshakably 
                                                 
89 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68  CHI. L. REV. 101 (2001).  
90 See, e.g., U.S. CONST., AMENDMENT X.  
91 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
92 See id. at 189-98 (expansively defining both “commerce”—as “a general term” that should not be 
restricted “to one of its significations”—and “regulation”). 
93 I refer here to experience in the Lochner, New Deal, and post-New Deal eras that the brief immediately 
proceeded to discuss very commendably. 
94 In my view, a scholars’ brief that only recited historical evidence supporting a broad interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause, but purported to claim only that, for example, such an interpretation “finds substantial 
support in the original understanding,” would fall short—though perhaps only barely so—under what I 
have characterized as the obligations of trustworthiness and confrontation.  Although not false, the 
proffered formulation would be slightly misleading in its failure to acknowledge specific historical 
evidence that would support rival characterizations of the original understanding. 
 
  31committed to the view that the death penalty is not per se unconstitutional.  Can the 
professor write or sign a scholars’ brief that argues that a particular defendant has a right 
not to be executed even under precedents that she believes ought not be accepted and 
that, in her capacity as teacher or scholar, she would criticize the Supreme Court for 
failing to overturn?  Or can a law professor who is a constitutional originalist—and 
would criticize the Supreme Court for failing to decide a case strictly on originalist 
grounds—participate in a brief that makes arguments that depend for their validity on 
non-originalist assumptions?   
 
In cases of this kind, I believe that the standards of trustworthiness applicable to 
scholars’ briefs call for candor.  As I have said, law professors acting as amici should be 
able to call attention to arguments that they expect judges to find relevant, even when the 
judges’ jurisprudential assumptions are ones that the professors do not share.  But if the 
arguments in a scholars’ brief depend on premises that the professors who sign it would 
not embrace in their capacity as teachers or scholars, other than for purposes of argument, 
then the norm of trustworthiness requires those who participate in the brief to make clear 
the terms on which they do so.  That norm also requires scholars’ briefs to advance only 
such arguments as the signatories sincerely believe to be good ones given the 
assumptions that they have granted. 
 
C.  Collective Expressions of Purportedly Expert Opinion to Non-Judicial 
Decision Makers 
 
During the imbroglio surrounding the impeachment of President Bill Clinton, 
several hundred law professors—some with no special expertise in constitutional law—
signed a joint letter expressing their judgment that Clinton’s alleged misdeeds did not rise 
to the level of “high crimes and misdemeanors” in the constitutional sense.
95  Other 
professors have signed similar letters expressing collective opinions about other issues on 
other occasions.  In my view, the standards of scholarly integrity applicable to such 
letters closely approximate those that govern scholars’ briefs.  I shall therefore address 
those standards in the same order as above.  
 
Where there are good reasons for brevity, the norm that calls for scholarly books 
and articles fairly to confront non-obvious opposing arguments does not apply with 
undiluted stringency to joint statements of professional judgment or opinion.  Professors 
should be as entitled as anyone else to assert their conclusions in relatively conclusory 
form without needing to rehearse all of the relevant, underlying considerations.  
Frequently, however, there will be powerful tactical reasons to address competing claims 
that have already entered or are likely to enter public debate.  
 
Although I see no reason to think that a law professor’s obligation to take 
personal responsibility for claims asserted is any different for joint letters than for amicus 
briefs, the same norm may generate different problems of application in the two cases.  
Amicus briefs typically make quite specific claims about the content and applicability of 
identified legal authorities, such as statutes and judicial precedents.  By contrast, 
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  32statements of collective opinion in letters to non-judicial decision-makers frequently 
assert their conclusions without providing any substantial supporting argument.  In such 
cases, the pertinent issue involves a law professor’s capacity to present an opinion as 
reflecting expert knowledge of materials that a collective statement does not specifically 
discuss.  Professor Ward Farnsworth has suggested a number of heuristics for gauging 
expertise,
96 one of which seems especially apt.  A professor considering whether to join a 
collective statement should ask herself if she would feel competent to present and defend 
the collective statement at a faculty workshop.
97  If not, she should presumptively 
conclude that she cannot, with integrity, take personal responsibility for the accuracy of 
the purportedly expert opinion that a letter expresses. 
 
With regard to trustworthiness, a professor should join a collective statement only 
if she sincerely believes it to be correct and not misleading.   She should assure herself 
that she would not wish to recant the legal judgments that the statement expresses in a 
future case with different political or partisan implications. 
 
V.  Second Thoughts? 
 
If my recommendations achieved universal adherence, there would probably be 
substantially fewer scholars= briefs than there are today, or at least many fewer law 
professors would sign such briefs.  But of course not every law professor will apply the 
standards that I have advocated.  In going forward, I therefore make two assumptions for 
the sake of argument.  First, if morally scrupulous or enlightened law professors began 
immediately to act on my analysis, they would enjoy less influence on the development 
of the law than some of them now exert.  Second, and correspondingly, morally or 
ethically less scrupulous law professorsBwho would continue to join scholars= briefs 
whenever those briefs argue for a result that they have an ideological disposition to 
favorBwould achieve greater impact.
98  Given these assumptions, should morally and 
ethically scrupulous law professors reconsider my prescriptions? Should or must they 
cede practical influence to the less morally and ethically enlightened?   
 
A.  Is It Too Late? 
 
If we assume that many law professors regularly sign scholars’ briefs based more 
on ideology than on expert knowledge and insight, and that many will continue to do so, 
it might seem appropriate to reconsider the question whether role-morality might justify 
them in doing so.  If nearly everyone regarded the signing of a scholars’ brief as little 
                                                 
96 See Farnsworth, supra note __, at 41-49.  Professor Farnsworth initially asserts that “when academics 
offer opinions in their professional capacities, they should use the same care and have the same expertise 
called for in their published work,” but then offers a number of heuristics unrelated to the publication of 
scholarship to determine whether this standard is satisfied.  See id. 
97 See id. at 45. 
98 Although I assume this to be the case for sake of argument, it is of course possible that judges and 
Justices would learn over time which law professors are more scrupulous and which are less so, and that the 
more scrupulous professors would enjoy enhanced credibility in those cases in which their standards for 
participation were actually met.  See, e.g., Lynch, supra note __, at 53 (noting that Supreme Court law 
clerks report a propensity to value some law professors’ briefs more highly than others’). 
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basis would mislead no one and defeat no one’s reasonable expectations.  There would be 
no harm to others, and thus, arguably, no wrong. 
 
But this position reflects twin mistakes.  To begin with, although there may be 
growing cynicism about scholars’ briefs pretensions to disinterested expertise, the view 
that no one expects such briefs to satisfy higher, role-based standards of integrity than 
lawyers’ briefs on behalf of clients seems false.  As noted above, some number of judges, 
Justices, and law clerks still regard scholars’ briefs as being, as a class, distinctively 
valuable.
99  Current and emerging practice may have devalued the currency of scholarly 
expertise in which all law professors trade, but assertions of scholarly authority do not yet 
appear to be worthless.  
 
Moreover, even if there were a now-recognized social role of professor-as-signer-
of-scholars’-briefs, and even if those occupying that role were not generally expected to 
meet obligations of scholarly integrity, I do not believe that such a role could be justified, 
any more than the role of a Mafioso is justified by the social expectations surrounding it.  
If not, then expectations that law professors who join scholars’ briefs will not hold the 
briefs to reasonable standards of scholarly integrity could not excuse occupants of that 
role from the ordinary, non-role-based moral standards that require people to be truthful 
and not misleading in their dealings with others.  Nothing inherent in the idea of an 
adversary system requires authorizing law professors to claim to speak with scholarly 
expertise while making assertions that could not satisfy even reasonably adjusted 
scholarly norms.  
 
B.  The Significance (or Insignificance) of Consequences 
 
To say that law professors contemplating participation in scholars’ briefs are 
subject to scholarly norms is not necessarily to say that those professors should comply 
with those norms in every case.  In considering what law professors who are asked to 
participate in scholars’ briefs ultimately ought to do, it may seem tempting to compare 
their situation with that of officials and others in public roles who have the capacity to 
affect important public policies.  As noted earlier, I believe that those with broad 
responsibilities and capacities to protect the interests of others may sometimes have a 
moral license or even an obligation to deviate from the deontological norms that 
predominate in private life and to follow a consequentialist ethic.  Professor Nagel 
maintains that those in public roles should sometimes be Aruthless.@
100  Michael Walzer 
suggests that people who can achieve sufficiently important results only if they breach 
moral norms should acquire morally Adirty hands.@
101  If these comparisons are apt, law 
professors who compromise their acknowledged obligations of responsibility, 
trustworthiness, or confrontation, but do so in order to promote good consequences, 
might claim adequate justification for doing so, all things considered.  
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  34Although arguments to this effect might not be frivolous in all cases, it is hard to 
imagine contexts in which they would not ring hollow.  However flattering it might be to 
be told otherwise, the likelihood that any particular law professor’s agreement to join a 
scholars= brief will actually influence the outcome of a case seems small under nearly all 
circumstances.  Someone else will have prepared a brief already.  That brief will most 
likely attract other signatories.  There is no apparent reason to assume, ex ante, that the 
law professors who too readily join scholars= briefs will tend systematically to take the 
Awrong@ side on the merits.  
 
There are, moreover, two relevant risks.  First, a law professor who deviates from 
the standards of integrity that appropriately apply to scholars’ briefs risks further 
degrading the credibility that the general class of scholars’ briefs possesses.  This is an 
important negative externality.  Individual law professors ought to hesitate long before 
undermining the credibility of other law professors to speak sincerely as disinterested 
scholars.  
 
Second, there is a related risk that deviation from appropriate standards of 
scholarly integrity will foster the impression that law professors as a class tend to lack 
scholarly integrity in all contexts.  To the extent that this impression exists or takes hold, 
the result may include the dismissal or discounting not just of scholars’ briefs, but also of 
law professors’ books and journal articles.  This would be an even more disturbing 
negative externality of promiscuous participation in scholars’ briefs. 
 
C.   Responsibility Revisited 
 
A further consideration fortifies the conclusions that I have pressed, but also 
brings new questions of its own.  Insofar as the obstacle to participating in an amicus 
brief involves the law professor’s obligation of personal responsibility, a law professor 
always has the option of putting aside other projects and reading the sources on which a 
scholars’ brief relies.  In the case of the brief on federal jurisdiction that I declined to 
join, I could have pulled out the cases and—as I fully expect—confirmed that I concurred 
in Professor Dorf’s characterizations and in the conclusions that they supported.  And if a 
draft scholars’ brief that others have proffered for signature does not satisfy applicable 
standards of trustworthiness or confrontation, then I or any other law professor who 
regards a case as urgently important could draft and file her own amicus brief.  During 
the Supreme Court’s 2010 Term, at least five law professors filed amicus briefs on behalf 
of themselves alone.
102 
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If I am right in insisting on the pertinence of these alternatives, a question 
obviously arises about whether and when law professors who are asked to join amicus 
briefs supporting conclusions with which they would expect to agree, but who lack 
personal familiarity with some of the authorities relied on, should feel obliged to take up 
the burden of acquiring the requisite knowledge.  This may be a difficult question in 
some cases.  Because the role of law professor includes a capacity to achieve some 
consequences that others could not achieve, it may attract special obligations.  It would 
often be wrong for a doctor not to suspend other projects to stop someone from dying on 
the street.  Most of the time, however, the situation of a law professor asked to sign a 
scholars’ brief will exhibit only a remote similarity to that of a doctor who is uniquely 
well situated to render urgent care.  Among other things, I am assuming for the moment 
that other law professors will have begun trying to help already. 
 
It would be a mistake, however, to dismiss too cavalierly the thought that law 
professors, or at least some law professors, might have moral or ethical obligations to 
work on amicus briefs from time to time.  As I have said, there are many ways to live an 
ethically admirable life as a law professor.  But if we think that our participation in 
amicus briefs might produce good results, we may have duties to do our fair share in 
promoting those good consequences that law professors are singularly competent to bring 
about.
103  Just as wealthy corporate lawyers may have duties to do at least some unpaid 
work pro bono publico, some law professors might well conclude that they fail to do their 
fair share unless they lend their talents to the production of amicus briefs in important 
cases from time to time.  If some law professors recurrently work on such briefs, they 
deserve admiration for their efforts (as long as they comply with other applicable moral 
and ethical norms). 
 
Nevertheless, I believe that law professors are ordinarily entitled to pursue their 
own professional projects, especially those of a scholarly nature, rather than being subject 
to conscription to investigate the sustainability of the claims of scholars= briefs that others 
ask them to join.
104  If there are many ways to lead an ethically attractive life as a law 
                                                                                                                                                 
During the Supreme Court’s 2009 Term, the majority opinion in Skilling v. United States, 130 S. 
Ct. 2896 (2010), cited, quoted from, and adopted the position urged by the solo amicus brief of 
Northwestern Law School Professor Albert Alschuler.  See id. at 2933. 
103 See AALS, Statement of Good Practices by Law Professors, Sec. 5 (“Responsibilities to the Bar and 
General Public”), supra note __ (“One of the traditional obligations of members of the bar is to engage in 
uncompensated public service or pro bono legal activities.  As role models for students and as members of 
the legal profession, law professors share this responsibility.”).  Such duties would be analogous but not 
identical to those falling under what Liam Murphy has called “a ‘collective principle of benevolence,’ 
according to which people must sustain only that amount of sacrifice they would be required to sustain if 
everyone were doing their part.”  Liam Murphy, Beneficence, Law, and Liberty: The Case of Required 
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distinctive talents, some law professors might rightly regard frequent devotion of energy 
to amicus briefs as being both ethically attractive and personally rewarding.  Others 
might just as reasonably think that they both satisfy their duties of benevolence and live 
better as law professors by contributing to the public good in other ways. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
With respect to questions of professional identity, many of today=s law professors 
want to be valued as scholars on a par with professors on faculties of arts and sciences 
who devote their careers to the sometimes lonely search for truth or honest insight.  Yet 
many also aspire to achieve an immediate influence on public events in ways that few 
members of faculties of arts and sciences could dream of.  In seeking to realize the latter 
ambition, we may face temptations to tailor our arguments to our audiences, to overstate 
the strength of the support for our conclusions, and to omit to say what would reduce our 
impact. 
 
The vocation of a law professor is not exclusively that of a scholar.  We can, and 
should, play multiple roles.  In doing so, however, we should remember that when we 
attempt to influence public matters, we almost inevitably seek to trade on the credibility 
that weBand our predecessors and colleaguesBhave earned in the roles of scholar and 
teacher.  Those roles create obligations of responsibility, trustworthiness, and 
confrontation.  If emerging norms in the signing of scholars= briefs betray expectations of 
scholarly responsibility, trustworthiness, and confrontation that we have sought to 
promote, or seek to capitalize upon, then we should hold ourselves to higher standards. 
 
My argument for this conclusion has sounded largely in the domain of morals, or 
of what we owe to each other: When we claim to speak with the authority of scholars, we 
engender—and indeed aim to engender—expectations of responsibility, trustworthiness, 
and confrontation.  If we fail to meet the reasonable expectations that we create or try to 
trade upon, we behave wrongly.  The wrongs that we do may not be large, but they are 
wrongs nonetheless 
 
Although this conclusion sounds in a sternly moralistic register, many of the 
hardest questions about the vocation of a law professor are less moral than ethical, 
involving the relative worthiness of morally eligible choices.  Is it better for a law 
professor to devote her professional energies to scholarship, law reform projects, 
consulting activities, paid or pro bono work for individual clients, public education 
through publications in or appearances on the mass media, participation in amicus briefs 
in high-stakes cases, or any of myriad other activities?  Questions such as this have no 
single, determinate, generalizable answer. There are many ways to live well as a law 
professor.  A thousand flowers ought to bloom, as they do today and undoubtedly will in 
the future.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
system, advising local, state and national government officials on legal issues, engaging in legislative 
drafting, or other law reform activities.”). 
 
  37But there are limits.  Amid the burgeoning gardens of law professors’ professional 
activities, I have argued for careful distinctions among the sub-roles that law professors 
play and for attention to the sometimes varied demands of responsibility, trustworthiness, 
and confrontation that may apply within those various sub-roles.  When law professors 
purport to speak as scholars or disinterested legal experts, those demands grow more 
stringent than is often recognized today. 
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